Index
259 Index abstract right, 16 amour propre, 140n26, 176 Anderson-Gold, Sharon, 82, 94n127 animality, 141, 200 antinomies: in Critique of Practical Reason, 56–60 Aristotle, 22, 111 arrogance, 188–89, 191–92, 201, 203, 236 autonomy, 13, 17, 30–31, 85, 95, 108, 144n41, 150–51, 157, 158–59, 232–33, 235, 247 Baron, Marcia, 114, 117, 173n6 Basedow, Johann, 136 Beck, Lewis White, 30–31, 45, 48, 62–63, 78 Beiser, Frederick, 63 beneficence, 171, 179–81, 212 Buchanan, Allen, 7n8, 8 character, 99–100, 110–21, 126; and education, 137–38, 146, 151, 154; and friendship, 170–71, 177–78; as mode of thinking, 111–14 citizen: types of, 221–23 civil society: participation in, 22, 47, 120, 204–40 coercion: in civil society, 205, 207– 8, 213; in education, 149, 159–60 Collegium Fridericianum, 130–32, 137 common sense, 104, 191–93 communitarian criticisms of Kant’s ethics, 4–19 community, 1–3, 241–51; criticisms of Kant’s views on, 5–20; as end of moral action, 3, 25, 70–80; as enjoying the highest good, 51–52, 70–80, 86–88; as ground of moral action, 26; Kant’s positive account of, 20–23; and tendency to compare ourselves to others, 94–95. See also ethical community comparison with others, 22, 171, 176–77, 224; dangers of in friendship, 176–77, 180–83, 185, 187, 189, 196–97 conceit. See self-conceit consent, 216–21, 239–40; and effect on moral reasoning, 236– 40; levels of consent-seeking in Kant’s political philosophy, 220–24 consultation, 217–24, 236–40 contentment, 28–29 criticism, 214, 217, 227–29; as duty in republican government, 229, 235; and effect on moral reasoning , 232–36; as natural calling, 228; right of, 228–29 Deligiorgi, Katerina, 219n24 democracy, 216n20 Denis, Lara, 76n94, 167n100, 220n25 desire: for happiness, 32–33, 73; as responsive to reason, 114–17 despondency, 188–89, 201, 203 detachment of liberal agents: from essential ends, 5–10; from history or narrative, 10–20 discipline, 117; as part of moral education, 141, 143, 147–51, 159–60 duties of right, 9 260 I n de x education, 21, 47, 94n128, 112n32, 120, 125, 127–67; apparent tension with Kant’s moral epistemology , 127–28; and character, 137–38; civilization, 143, 153–54; as coercive, 158–62; cultivation, 151–54; developing love of virtue, 134–35; and dialogue, 156–57; discipline, 143, 147–51; domestic vs. public, 149–50; duty of, 128, 165–66; and highest good, 128–29, 164–67; Kant’s early education, 130–33; Kant’s interest in, 142–43; moralization, 143, 154–58; negative education, 143– 51; nurture, 143; positive education , 143, 151–58; and punishment , 135, 148–49; and religion, 138n23, 156; in 17th and 18th centuries, 130–34; social vs. individual , 141–42, 149–50; stages in Kant’s account, 143; suggested methods, 152; use of examples in, 157; whether necessary for moral development, 162–63 egoism, 214, 228, 231, 236–40; and political participation, 238–40 Emile (Rousseau), 138–43, 146n48 empirical facts: and applying the moral law, 46–47, 125, 165–66; as limitation on agency, 11–13 ends: acting for sake of, 75; adopting others’ as our own, 9, 12, 75; that are also duties, 73–76, 199–200. See also realm of ends end-setting, 2, 6–7, 42, 75 Engstrom, Stephen, 46, 49n44, enthusiasm, moral, 135n13, 157–58 Epicureanism: relation between virtue and happiness in, 28, 55, 63 ethical community, 1, 3, 20–23, 26–27, 70–80, 82–83, 99, 101, 122, 126, 204–5, 241–42, 245–47; God as legislator of, 81–82; vs. juridical state, 82 ethical life, 18–19 equality: in friendship, 175–77, 180, 194–95 evil: Rousseau’s account of, 139. See also radical evil example, 157, 233, 235, 247 fact of reason, 13, 36, 104, 127, 245 faith. See moral faith feminist critiques of Kant, 168 Franklin, Benjamin, 151n71 freedom: early experience of, 144, 147, 149–51; internal vs. external use of, 206–7, 218, 236; and universal principle of right, 206 freedom of the will: as postulate of pure practical reason, 41–42, 44 friendship, 22, 47, 112, 125, 168– 203; as balance of love and respect , 172–78; criticism of Kant’s account, 202–3; and dangers of comparison, 180–83, 187, 196; and duty of beneficence, 179–80; and duty to perfect talents, 182– 83; duty to pursue, 170, 177–78, 199–204; and imperfect...
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