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141 Article 16 The sixteenth thing to be asked is whether a multitude can proceed from one first thing. And it seems that it cannot.1 obj. 1. For just as God is good per se and consequently is the supreme good, so is he the per se and supreme one. But insofar as he is good nothing can proceed from him except what is good. Therefore neither can anything proceed from him except what is one. obj. 2. As good is convertible with being, so also is one. But those things which are common must be considered a likeness of the creature to God, as was said above.2 Therefore, just as in goodness so also in unity is the creature to be likened to God, as namely being one thing from one thing. obj. 3. Just as good and evil are mutually exclusive if taken together (although they are contraries considered as differentiating habits), so one and many are mutually exclusive, as is made clear in Metaphysics X.3 But wickedness can in no way be said to proceed from God, but rather it occurs because of deficiency in second causes. Therefore, neither should we hold that God is the cause of a multitude. obj. 4. We must understand cause and effect to be proportionate, for it is clear that single things cause single things and universal things cause universal things, as the Philosopher makes plain in Physics II.4 But God is the supremely universal cause. Therefore his proper effect is the most universal effect, namely being. But multitude does not result from things having being, since diversity and difference are the cause of multitude, while all things agree in being. Therefore multitude comes not from God but from second causes which cause the particular conditions of things in terms of which beings differ. obj. 5. Every effect is understood to have a proper cause. But it is 1. For parallel discussion of this question and the issues raised in response to it, see ST I Q. 47, a. 1, and SCG II 39–45 and III 97. 2. In article 1, ad 12. 3. Aristotle, Metaphysics, X 3, 1054a23–27. 4. Aristotle, Physics, II 3, 195b25–27. 142 On Creation impossible that one be proper to many. Therefore it is impossible that one be the cause of a multitude. obj. 6. But one might say that this holds for natural causes but not for voluntary causes. On the contrary, a craftsman is the voluntary cause of his work, but his work proceeds from him according to the proper form of that work which is in the [mind of the] craftsman . Therefore even in voluntary effects, each one requires a proper cause. obj. 7. There must be conformity between cause and effect. But God is entirely one and simple. Therefore neither multitude nor composition ought to be found in the creature which is his effect. obj. 8. One effect cannot proceed immediately from different agents. But just as cause is appropriated to effect, so is effect to cause. Therefore neither can one cause immediately produce many effects. And so the same conclusion follows. obj. 9. In God the same power generates, spirates,5 and creates. But the generative power terminates in only one, and likewise the spirating power, since there can be only one Son and one holy Spirit in the Trinity. Therefore the creative power also terminates in only one thing. obj. 10. But one might say that the universe of creatures is in a certain way one, namely by order. On the contrary, an effect must be like its cause. But God’s unity is not a unity of order, since in God there is neither prior and posterior nor higher and lower. Therefore a unity of order does not suffice to make it possible that many things be educed from one God. obj. 11. One simple thing has only one action. But only one effect comes from one action. Therefore only one effect can proceed from one simple thing. obj. 12. A creature proceeds from God not only as an effect from an efficient cause, but also as exemplate from exemplar. But one exemplar has only one proper exemplate. Therefore only one creature can proceed from God. obj. 13. God causes things through his intellect. But intellectual agents act through the form of their intellects. Therefore, since there 5. I am following Fr. Shapcote’s translation of spirandi. [3.138.113.188] Project MUSE...

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