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119 Article 13 The thirteenth thing to ask is whether something which is from another can be eternal. And it seems that it cannot.1 obj. 1. For nothing which always is needs something in order that it be. But everything which is from another needs that by which it is in being. Therefore nothing which is from another always is. obj. 2. Nothing receives that which it already has.2 But that which always is, always has being. Therefore that which always is does not receive being. But everything which is from another receives being from that from which it is. Therefore nothing which is from another always is. obj. 3. That which [already] is, is not generated or made or in any way produced in being, since something [to be] made does not [yet] exist. But everything which is generated or made or produced must at some time not exist, and everything which is from another is of this sort. Therefore everything which is from another at some time does not exist. But that which at some time does not exist, is not always. Therefore nothing which is from another is sempiternal.3 obj. 4. That which has being only from another, considered in itself is not. But a thing of this sort must at some time not be. Therefore everything which is from another must at some time not be and consequently is not sempiternal. 1. As the replies to the objections and the respondeo make clear, the question here is whether the second person of the Trinity (the Son) can be both from another (ab alio, i.e., from the Father) and also eternal. For parallel discussions of issues raised here, see ST I Q. 27, a. 1; ST III Q. 16, a. 9 and Q. 17, a. 2; and SCG IV 14, especially par. 3. The next article here in Q. 3 of the De potentia deals with the question whether a creature (which is not from the Father in the way the Son is, but is from God as its efficient cause) can be both from God and eternal. 2. I have been unable to trace a reference for this text. 3. est sempiternum. As I read Thomas, he uses “sempiternus” interchangeably with “aeternus.” In the De potentia he uses the former only here in article 13 and in article 14, and then only in response to objections which use this term. For an examination of sempiternity as a distinct concept, see Dario Schioppetto, “L’Ombra dell’Eterno: Note sul Tempo degli Angeli,” cited above in article 10, note 8. 120 On Creation obj. 5. Every effect is posterior to its cause. But that which is from another is the effect of that which it is from. Therefore it is posterior to that from which it is and thus cannot be sempiternal. On the contrary, Hilary says, That which is born of the Father from eternity, is born from eternity.4 But the Son of God is born of the eternal Father. Therefore he is born from eternity. Therefore he is eternal. I answer that, since we hold that the Son of God proceeds from the Father naturally, we must say that he is from the Father in such a way as to be nevertheless coeternal with him. This may be shown as follows. For the will and nature differ, in that nature is determined to one thing both with respect to what is produced by the power of nature and with respect to producing or not producing. But the will is found to be determined in neither respect. For by the will someone is able to make this or that, as for example a craftsman is able to make a bench or a box, and again to make or to stop making. Fire, on the other hand, cannot fail to heat if the subject of its action is present, nor can it induce in matter an effect other than its like. And so, although it may be said of creatures which proceed from God by the divine will that he could make this or that creature at this or that time, this cannot be said of the Son, who proceeds naturally. For in his nature the Son could be in no other way than that he has in himself the nature of the Father. Nor could the Son be sooner or later in relation to the Father’s nature. For it cannot be...

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