At the Limits of Political Philosophy: From "Brilliant Errors" to Things of Uncommon Importance

12. Friendship and Political Philosophy

TWELVE Friendship and Political Philosophy "MRS. KNOWLES. '[ cannot agree with him fSoame JenynsJ, that friendship is not a Christian virtue.' JOHNSON. 'Why, Madam, strictly speaking, he is right. Allfriendship is preferring the interest ofafriend, to the neglect, or, perhaps, against the interest ofothers; so that an old Greek said, "He that has friends has no friend." Now Christianity recommends universal benevolence, to consider all men as our brethren, which is contrary to the vzrtue offriendship, as described by the ancient philosophers. Surely, Madam, your sect f0JakersJ must approve ofthis; for, you call all men friends.' MRS. KNOWLES. 'We are commanded to do good to all men, "but especially to them who are of the household of Faith".' JOHNSON. 'Well, Madam. The household of Faith is wide enough.' MRS. KNOWLES. 'But, Doctor, our Saviour had twelve Apostles , yet there was one whom he loved. John was called "the disciple whomJesus loved".' j 0 H N SON. (with eyes sparkling benignantly,) 'Very well, indeed, Madam. You have said very well.' BOS WELL. 'A fine application . Pray, Sir, had you ever thought of it?' JOHNSON. '[ had not, Sir'." -SAMUEL JOHNSON, April 15, 17781 1. Friendship in Human Discourse Nothing is more surprising in the Ethics of Aristotle than the two books (Books VIII and IX; also, St. Thomas's Commentary) that the Philosopher devotes to friendship. Though we can speak of a "virtue" of friendship, friendship is not strictly speaking a specific virtue. Rather it presupposes the discourse on the virtues 1. Boswell's Life ofJohnson (London: Oxford, 1931), II, p. 219. 218 Friendship and Political Philosophy 219 that we have examined. Likewise, the discussion offriendship has to do with Aquinas's deliberations on law; friendship, he says surprisingly , is law's end or purpose. It is the condition of the flourishing of the virtues, the relationship in which they are most real. Friendship can be based on different kinds of communication, that is, on utility, or pleasure, or knowledge. Friendship must also consider the relationship of the friends to each other. They might simply be good men or women, or husband and wife, brothers, sisters, companions, fellow citizens, or perhaps even strangers. Both the nature of the relationship and the basis of communication between friends enter into the worth and value of friendship. Friendships must be free and chosen, even when they arise in such relationships as that of brothers and sisters. At some level, friends must live in the same world, with the same or compatible understandings of truth and goodness. We can paradoxically speak of "friendship" among thieves, though this friendship would be utilitarian and disordered. Plato remarked that we cannot do the maximum amount of injustice without some kind ofagreed upon understanding of the ')ustice" existing among thieves or other sorts of unjust men (35oC-52A). Scoundrels bound together in a kind of friendship are generally more dangerous than solitary evil men. The pseudo-')ustice" existing among thieves could well indicate a kind of "friendship," however perverted in its ends. Like any of our capacities, which can be corrupted by the ends chosen by their possessors, friendship can be deflected from its highest purpose and used for devious ends. Friendship, like justice, takes its highest meaning from right order in human relationships and from a right understanding of man's place in the world. Friendship takes its dignity from the truth and the good existing in reality and subsequently known and chosen by the friends as their own highest purpose. Friendship can exist only if something higher than friendship exists, something for which the friends themselves are seeking as the purpose of each life. Such was the lesson in Plato's Symposium. At this point, the discussion of happiness and friendship meet. No one would call anyone "happy," Aristotle thought, who possessed everything else but lacked friends (1l6gb17-19). On reflection , this is one of the most profoundly true remarks in all of 220 THE THINGS OF UNCOMMON IMPORTANCE classical thought; it still grounds the final meaning ofpolitical philosophy . Nothing can substitute for the reality of friends. Since friendship is the most profound point to which classical political philosophy brings us, it can serve also as the final consideration of those questions and answers that fall within the surprising incompleteness of political philosophy. We deal here still with "brilliant errors," yet somehow this question of friendship intimates for political philosophy rather some few "brilliant answers" to the...