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I argued in chapters 1 through 3 that abortion is the killing of a human person. In chapter 4 I argued that abortion is usually intentional killing, and that if it is not, it is still morally wrong. One might grant, however, that abortion is the intentional killing of a human person, but still hold that sometimes it is morally right, as a means to avoid bad consequences . Almost all moral theories hold that it is at least prima facie wrong intentionally to kill innocent persons. So, if one holds that it is in this or that case morally right, there must be some overriding reason. Usually the overriding reason consists in an appeal to consequences. So, although not every theory which denies it is always wrong intentionally to kill the innocent is consequentialist or utilitarian in its whole approach, still, the particular argument to justify intentionally killing the innocent is most likely to be consequentialist in its structure. Consequentialist arguments for abortion are more frequently presented in popular circles than in philosophical ones.1 When actual participants in abortion are asked about their reasons for choosing abortion, and about the morality of abortion itself, they frequently present consequentialist arguments. Thus, discussing her experience of abortion, a newspaper columnist who defends abortion wrote: 140 5 • Consequentialist Arguments 1. In philosophical journals the merits of consequentialism itself are more often discussed. Indeed, consequentialist cases for specific conclusions are seldom presented, with the exception of capital punishment. 141 Consequentialist Arguments About the question “Does life begin at conception?”—I don’t know. Life in a certain sense probably does begin at conception, even perhaps right before conception—the properties of life are in the sperm and they’re in the womb. But one must make tough choices in this world, harder choices than abortion.2 The suggestion is that even if abortion is the intentional killing of a human person—though there is hesitation to grant that point—it is sometimes justified as a means of avoiding very bad consequences. I. A Variety of Consequentialisms In recent years the discussion of consequentialism has become extraordinarily complicated. A definitive examination of consequentialism would require a more extensive treatment than I am able to give in this work. I will try here to set out some reasons which suggest that this approach has shortcomings. The consequentialist argument can be interpreted in various ways, because there are several types of consequentialism. The first distinction is that between egoistic consequentialism and utilitarianism.3 Both hold that an action is right if and only if it produces the best (or least bad) consequences. They differ on what consequences they consider significant. For the egoistic consequentialist the only sig2 . From The Choices We Made: Twenty-Five Women Speak Out About Abortion, ed. Angela Bonvoglia (New York: Random House, 1991), 87. Similarly, telling her story of abortion, an actress wrote, “Abortion might be killing a life; I don’t know. That to me is not an issue. If there is a sin, it is the sin that we adults perpetrate on the children of the earth who truly are innocent and defenseless by bringing those children into the world when they will not be cared for” (99). Another successful actress wrote: “I had that abortion because I viewed having a child at that time as an end to my life. All of my hopes and dreams for myself would have had to be put aside. I had planned and worked hard all my life to be an actress” (105). 3. Cf. William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), chap. 3, for this terminology. [3.137.218.230] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 02:01 GMT) 142 Consequentialist Arguments nificant ones are those which happen to oneself, whereas for the utilitarian the consequences for all those affected by one’s actions, not just those for oneself, must be counted. Few people defend egoistic consequentialism. In chapter 2 I argued that the goods one recognizes as intrinsically good are aspects of human fulfillment, and are recognized as good and worthy of pursuit not just as they can be instantiated in oneself but also as they can be in others. Thus, egoism is mistaken. I will therefore concentrate in the rest of this chapter on utilitarianism, that is, nonegoistic consequentialist arguments. There are several types of utilitarianism. The utilitarian may identify the good consequences as consisting in pleasure (hedonistic utilitarianism), or in the satisfaction of preferences (preference utilitarianism), or...

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