In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

108 In this chapter I examine the argument that abortions, or many abortions, are morally right because they are not intentional killing, or, as it is often described, indirect, as opposed to direct, killing. As I shall explain, this is an accurate way of describing the positions of, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson and Martha Brandt Bolton, which were further developed by David Boonin and Margaret Little. Along the way I shall also reply to the argument that killing the fetus is justified because the fetus is an aggressor, a denial that abortion is the intentional killing of an innocent person. The main proponent of the position I examine in this chapter has been Judith Thomson, in her famous article, “Defense of Abortion,” although others have presented essentially the same position.1 I will focus chiefly on Thomson’s presentation but will also refer to others. I. Thomson’s Arguments Thomson grants for the sake of argument that a fetus is a person from conception on, but she argues that even if 4 • Is Abortion Justified as Nonintentional Killing? 1. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” in The Problem of Abortion, ed. Joel Feinberg, 2d ed. (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1984), 173– 87. See also, e.g., Martha Brandt Bolton, “Responsible Women and Abortion Decisions,” in Having Children: Philosophical and Legal Reflections on Parenthood , ed. Onora O’Neill and William Ruddick (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); and F. M. Kamm, Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 109 Is abortion justified as nonintentional killing? this premise of opponents of abortion is granted, it does not follow that abortion is always immoral. She expresses the argument she wishes to respond to as follows: Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body; everyone would grant that. But surely a person’s right to life is stronger and more stringent than the mother’s right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be performed.2 Her reply to this position is to grant that the fetus has a right to life (at least for the sake of argument) but to deny that this right entails that the fetus has the right to everything she needs to sustain her life, in particular to the use of the woman’s body. Thomson holds that the mother does not have a right to secure the death of the fetus . Her position thus differs from those we examine in other chapters . She argues, rather, that the mother is not obligated to provide life support for the child in the form of the use of her body.3 The woman may, therefore, expel the fetus from her womb, if carrying the fetus to term would involve a great sacrifice on her part. To explain her position further, she makes the following now famous comparison: But now let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your 2. Thomson, “A Defense,” 174. 3. Ibid., 187. [3.145.152.98] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 15:36 GMT) 110 Is abortion justified as nonintentional killing? own. The director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you—we would never have permitted it if we had known. But, still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.” Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation?4 Thomson argues that it is not. And she argues that pregnancy is analogous in the relevant respects...

Share