Ethics of Procreation and the Defense of Human Life: Contraception, Artficial Fertilization, and Abortion

5. The Instrumentalization of Human Life: Ethical Considerations Concerning Reproductive Technology

153 5 The Instrumentalization of Human Life Ethical Considerations Concerning Reproductive Technology f The Problem In the following I will evaluate from an ethical point of view the technologies and modes of action associated with what is commonly called “artificial procreation.” When one speaks of “artificial procreation,” “genetic engineering ,” and even of “artificial contraception,” many believe they have already identified the core of the problem with the term “artificial”—even though many of these same people speak without moral reservations about “artificial nutrition,” “organ transplants” (which in fact did create ethical concerns in the past), and other similar interventions. Indeed, “artificiality ” is less likely to be judged negatively in a medical context , given that medicine, taken as a whole, is an art to which many people owe their lives. This positive reception would certainly be the case for those who can continue to be what they are “by nature”—living bodily-spiritual beings—due to surgical interventions using artificial technologies (such as bypass surgery). And yet, the fulfillment of the desire to have children through in vitro fertilization, and the transfer of embryos, seem in some way to be “unnatural,” and therefore suspect. Why is this? 154   Injustices Recourse to “human nature”—or to “nature” tout court—is a traditional argumentative strategy for the foundation of moral norms, claims, requirements, or prohibitions. If we follow the philosophical tradition , however, we cannot ignore the fact that, at least in the context of morality, the concept that is opposed to “natural” is not “artificial,” but rather irrational or opposed to reason—precisely that which is opposed to man as a rational being, and therefore also opposed to his “nature.” The rational element, in fact, is precisely that part of his “nature” which characterizes man as man.1 I have indicated with these comments the context in which I wish to situate my argument. In particular, I will propose an argumentative context upon which I hope to clarify why so-called artificial procreation is morally evil; it is so precisely because it is opposed to a basic component of human rationality, and for this reason it is also not in accordance with “human nature.” This argument will not be carried out at the level of questions such as: Will any “spare” (i.e., leftover or supernumerary) embryos be destroyed ? What should be done in the case of the conception of twins? Are the risks and consequences involved foreseeable? How can abuses be avoided? These types of questions might pertain primarily to a practical political argument. My interest is rather in the fundamental ethical question: even if all these other questions were resolved, is it licit to produce human life in a test tube, so as to fulfill the desire for a child?2 The Inadequacy of Recourse to Nature To begin our discussion of in vitro fertilization (IVF) as a primary form of contemporary reproductive technology, it is of no importance in the present context what type of technology we are considering. I will also essentially “put in parentheses” the question (which in practice is decisively important, but secondary here) of whether so-called spare embryos are destroyed, as well as whether we are dealing with ho1 . Cf. on this R. Spaemann, Das Natürliche und das Vernünftige, Aufsätze zur Anthropologie (Munich-Zurich, 1987). See also my book Natural Law and Practical Reason, originally published in German as Natur als Grundlage der Moral. 2. I want to thank here Prof. Johannes Bonelli for posing valuable objections and corrections , as well as Prof. Josef Seifert, for his criticism and the debate that required me to make my argument more precise. The Instrumentalization of Human Life   155 mologous or heterologous IVF (the case of a heterologous semen donor simply raises an additional problem with respect to homologous IVF). Also irrelevant for our discussion is the question of the transplanting of embryos, or that of surrogate motherhood; all of these are ulterior questions . I would also like to note that the following argumentation applies equally to artificial fertilization in utero. Leaving aside the previously mentioned ulterior problems, one cannot in fact identify any ethically relevant distinction between artificial fertilization in utero and IVF; the problem does not lie in the fact that conception takes place outside the body, that is, it is not a problem of the test tube itself. This, then, is the basic question: is it morally licit, for whatever...