Good and Evil Actions: A Journey through Saint Thomas Aquinas

3. Exterior Actions

73 3 | Exterior Actions We are trying to discover the species of human actions, the per se order arising from within the agent and moving to some object. Intention seemed a plausible place to look for the source of this order , both on account of the very words of Aquinas and because intention is a principle of human actions. Unfortunately, the effort to draw the line between what is intended and what is outside intention is plagued with difficulties. Indeed, rather than intention drawing the line between action and consequence, it seems that the action itself must draw the line between intention and what is outside intention. We must turn our attention, therefore, to the exterior act of will. We will begin by noting that this exterior action is itself twofold , namely, the exterior action performed and the exterior action conceived (section 3.1). The remainder of the chapter will focus upon the exterior action conceived, which arises in our deliberations . We must examine how this action, the exterior action conceived, takes on a per se order to some object. In particular, we will focus upon what role, if any, the causal structure of the physical act plays (section 3.2), and we will see how the causal structure of the craniotomy bears upon its species (section 3.3). We will then see that what belongs to the species of the exterior action goes beyond intention. Some characteristics of an action give species even though they are not intended (section 3.4). The central feature of 74 Exterior Actions the exterior action, it will turn out, is the object upon which it is directed , the subject acted upon (section 3.5). Section 3.1. The Exterior Act Conceived Apparently, we have wound ourselves into a vicious circle.1 On the one hand, the exterior action—insofar as it is an act of will and not merely physical activity—does not provide its own moral endpoint but must be formed by intention. On the other hand, intention must be specified by its object, which is none other than the exterior action. The exterior action must receive its character from intention, but intention must receive its character from the exterior action. Two distinctions are needed to unravel this philosophical Gordian knot. We must first distinguish two ways in which something can be said to specify (section 3.1.1). Both the exterior action and intention play roles in the specification of human actions, but they do so in different ways. Second, we must distinguish between the exterior action as it is actually performed and as it is conceived in deliberation (section 3.1.2). 3.1.1. Two Specifications Something may be said to specify in two senses. We say that the agent’s intention specifies his actions, but we also say that the end or object of the action specifies the action. We should not presume, however, that the single word “specify” has but a single meaning. It might mean one thing for intention and something else for the end or object. An action is essentially a directional reality; it is headed somewhere . Just as a trip to Chicago is headed to Chicago, so the act of killing is headed to death. To “specify” the action is in some man1 . Portions of this section are taken from my article, “A Defense of Physicalism ,” The Thomist 61 (1997): 377–404. Exterior Actions 75 ner to determine or identify the direction that an action takes. Intention determines this direction by giving rise to it, by being its originating or efficient cause. The object, on the other hand, characterizes the direction through being the end toward which the action is directed. Just as the archer is the cause that directs the arrow, so the soldier ’s intention is the cause that directs his action. Without intention his action would be directionless; it would simply be a series of events. And without direction, there would be no per se action; everything would be accidental, and no species would remain. The physical act of pulling a trigger may have the upshot of death, but it has the per se direction towards death only because the agent intends to bring about death. The agent’s intention, then, specifies by giving direction to the exterior action. The object or end of the action plays a different specifying role. While intention gives direction to the act, the...