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16. WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR? T    affirms that every human person , regardless of intelligence, talents, social class, skin color, religious affiliation, or other distinguishing characteristics, has a right to be loved. Basic natural rights, beginning with the right to be loved for one’s own sake, are predicated universally of all human beings. The radical difference between persons and nonpersons leaves no room for distinctions among persons on this level, since “personhood” does not admit of degrees : either one is, or is not, a person. No one is “more” a person than anyone else. For this reason, all human beings are essentially equal in dignity and command equal regard qua persons. The idea of denying members of the human race the respect due to all is completely foreign to the personalist approach. Yet is this same universality present in Christ’s commandment to love one’s neighbor as oneself? Does not the very expression “love of neighbor ” make a distinction between neighbor and outsider, implicitly excluding the latter? Does not Christ himself at one point refer to the Old Testament imperative: “Love thy neighbor and hate thy enemy?” (Matt. :), which clearly distinguishes between “neighbors” and “others”? If Christ had wished to include all human beings, why didn’t he simply say so, instead of opting for the word “neighbor”? This question has been asked and answered by many saints and doctors of the Church. Two of the most complete and penetrating answers come from St. Augustine and St. Thomas. In their commentaries on the preceding passage, both, in fact, reach the identical conclusion: that Christ’s use of the word “neighbor” is meant to include all persons. Their reasoning sheds an intense theological light on personalism’s explanation of the universality of human rights.                   In his consideration of the second great commandment, St. Augustine offers three reasons why no person can be excluded from the category of “neighbor.” First, such exclusion would contradict Christ’s conduct.1 Though he was sent “only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel” (Matt. :), Christ himself exercised a universal love. Second, drawing from the parable of the Good Samaritan, Augustine associates “neighbor” with “one in need,” summarizing the moral of the parable by saying that “he is our neighbor whom it is our duty to help in his need, or whom it would be our duty to help if he were in need.” Finally, Augustine contends, how could anyone be omitted from the reach of love, when the most extreme cases—our enemies—are explicitly included?2 The commandment to love even one’s enemies, arguably the least worthy of love, clearly implies a commandment to love all people. Aquinas reaches the identical conclusion, reasoning from a different angle. The word “neighbor,” he points out, comes from the root meaning “near.”3 Thus when Christ says “love your neighbor” he means love whomever is “near to you.” This nearness does not mean just physical proximity but also all those who, like oneself, were made in God’s image and destined for eternal glory. “The reason for loving,” Thomas asserts, “is indicated in the word ‘neighbor,’ because the reason why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it matter whether we say ‘neighbor,’ or ‘brother’ according to  John :, or ‘friend,’ according to Lev. :, because all these words express the same affinity.”4 Charity, then, involves acknowledging another as neighbor, as like and near to oneself. Since all human beings are “near,” because all share the same nature and the same personal dignity, all fall within the scope of the charity each is bound to give his neighbor. . “[T]hat He who commanded us to love our neighbor made no exception, as far as men are concerned, is shown both by our Lord Himself in the Gospel, and by the Apostle Paul” (St. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, bk. I, ch. , pp. –). . “And, again, who does not see that no exception is made of any one as a person to whom the offices of mercy may be denied when our Lord extends the rule even to our enemies? .l.l. it is clear that every man is to be considered our neighbor, because we are to work no ill to any man” (ibid.). . This holds true both for the English word “neighbor,” which...

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