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12. CHRIST AND HUMAN DIGNITY p hilosophy does not have the final word on natural rights. A personalistic analysis of human rights takes place fundamentally on the level of natural law, since natural rights as such are comprehensible as principles of justice.1 Nonetheless, divine revelation adds much to the discussion and both confirms and exceeds what human reason alone can grasp. Christian personalism—Thomistic personalism in particular—benefits greatly from revelation for its understanding of the human person and his vocation to communion with God and is thereby able to offer even surer footing for human rights than can be provided by a personalism that relies on reason alone. Sacred Scripture reveals many truths to which the unaided light of reason alone can also attain, but this neither makes Scripture superfluous nor invalidates the knowledge acquired by reason.2 As the First Vatican Council teaches, the truth attained by philosophy and the truth of revelation are neither identical nor mutually exclusive. There exists, rather, “a twofold order of knowledge,” one order being that of natural reason, the other divine faith.3 Since, however, original sin weakened man’s intelligence , so that only with difficulty does he arrive at certain truths, theology provides an invaluable assistance to philosophical research.4                    . Thus Hamel notes: “The rights of man are inherent in the person as such and belong in themselves to the domain of reason and not of faith” (“Fondement théologique des droits de l’homme,” ; author’s translation). . Thus the Catechism states: “The precepts of natural law are not perceived by everyone clearly and immediately. In the present situation sinful man needs grace and revelation so moral and religious truths may be known ‘by everyone with facility, with firm certainty and with no admixture of error’ (Pius XII, Humani Generis: DS ; cf. Dei Filius : DS )” (CCC, ). . See Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, IV: DS . . “Of spiritual punishments, the principal is weakness of reason, the result being that  In a well-known text Aquinas considers whether it is fitting that truths accessible to reason should be proposed to man as an object of belief.5 Aquinas enumerates three disadvantages that would result if certain truths were left solely to the inquiry of human intelligence. First, few people would arrive at these truths, either because of a natural indisposition to speculative thought, or laziness, or a lack of time to devote to such pursuits. Second, these truths would be reached only after a long time because of their complexity and depth, the need for previous knowledge of many things, and the fact that youth do not possess the calm and prudence needed to reach the knowledge of sublime truths. Third, much falsehood is mingled into the knowledge acquired by human reason, especially on more difficult topics, and given that many people considered wise teach contrary opinions regarding these issues. These same arguments , which Aquinas adduces regarding the revelation of divine truths such as the existence of God, apply equally well to principles of natural law.6 Revelation provides an especially useful service by shoring up natural ethics with certain principles regarding the nature of the human person and what he deserves in justice. “Numerous are the philosophical errors concerning the nature of justice and rights,” explains Ashley, “which require to be corrected in the light of God’s Word. For example, the materialists deny the difference between human beings and brute animals, and hence either deny both any rights, or (more recently) claim that animals have the same rights as humans.”7 Thus, for example, though human reason is capable of discerning the essential difference between persons and nonpersons, many do not arrive at this truth, so Scripture’s attestations concerning the uniqueness of the human person made in God’s image                       man encounters difficulty in acquiring knowledge of the truth, and easily falls into error” (CG, bk. IV, ch. ). . See ibid., I, . See also Pius XII, Humani Generis: H. Denzinger and A. Schönmetzer, eds., Enchiridion Symbolorum, rd ed. (Freiburg, ),  (hereafter DS); Dei Filius, II: DS . . Speaking of the difference between a purely natural ethics and Christian ethics, C. Henry Peschke asserts: “There is only a difference in the knowledge and understanding of human nature, of the ultimate end, and by that of the moral law; a difference, certainly, which is still important and which is not to be slighted. Christian faith imparts to man an...

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