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CHAPTER 4 451A18–451B10 451a18 It remains, however, for us to talk about recollecting; first it is necessary to set out as being whatever things in the argumentative discourses are true. 451a20 For recollection is neither the recovery of a memory nor its acquisition . 451a21 For when one first learns or is affected, one does not recover any memory at all: for none has come into being before. 451a23 Nor does one acquire it from the beginning. For when a habit or an affection is engendered, then there is memory. Hence memory is not engendered along with the affection that is being engendered. 451a25 Further, when it has first come to be in the individual and the ultimate , the affection or knowledge already does indeed exist in the one affected, if one must call knowledge a habit or an affection. Nothing, however, prevents us from remembering by accident certain things that we know; but remembering by itself does not exist before time having come into being: for one remembers now what one has heard or seen or been affected by before; one does not remember now what he has experienced now. 451a31 Further it is clear that there is remembering for one that is not now recollecting but sensing or being affected from the beginning. 451b2 But when one recovers what he had before—knowledge or sense or the habit of that which we called memory—this is recollecting and it exists then, and is not any of the things that have been stated; but remembering is concomitant and memory follows. 451b6 Nor then do these come about without qualification if, although they were before, they come about again, but it is so in one way and in another is not. For it is possible for the same to learn and discover twice; hence recollecting must differ from these, there also being a further principle than that from which they learn for recollecting. Commentary 451a18 After the Philosopher has settled his determination on memory and remembering, he turns to the topic of recollecting. 205 First he states the object of his interest; second he pursues the goal set out, where he says For recollection is neither (451a20). Accordingly, first he says that after he has spoken1 about remembering it remains for us to talk about recollecting, in order that whatever truths might be taken up by means of the dialectical discussions may first be supposed as being true. In this way he excuses himself from a long disputation about things pertaining to recollection.2 451a20 Then, when he says For recollection is neither, he pursues the goal he had set out. In regard to this he does three things. First he shows what recollection is by comparing it to other apprehensions. Second he determines the mode of recollecting where he says Recollections happen (Ch.5, 451b10). Third he shows what sort of affection recollection is where he says Now, then, that those with good memories (Ch.8, 453a14). In regard to the first of these he does two things. First he shows what recollection is not. Second he shows what it is where he says But when one recovers (451b2). On the first of these points he does two things. First he sets out what he intends to do. Second he explains what he set out to do where he says For when one first learns (451a21). Accordingly, first he says that recollection is neither the recovery of a memory, in the sense that recollecting would be nothing but a repeated remembering; nor again is recollection the first acquisition of a knowable object, namely the acquisition that arises through the sense or the intellect . 451a21 Then when he says For when one first learns, he explains what he had said. In regard to this he does two things. First he shows the difference between the two terms he had set out, namely, the recovery of a memory and the acquisition of one. Second he shows that recollection is not the recovery of a memory and also not an acquisition, where he says Further it is clear that remembering (451a31). On the first point he does two things. First he shows that the acquisition is not memory, since he who acquires is not remembering. Second, where he says Nor does one acquire it from the beginning (451a23) he shows that the converse is not true either: memory is not acquisition, because he who remembers is not acquiring something new. 206 COMMENTARY...

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