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12 Kant’s Formulations of the Categorical Imperative 1. introduction Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative commands respect for rational agents as ends in themselves. Korsgaard has interpreted this as commanding respect for rationality as the source of the value of our goals in life. She says, “But the distinctive feature of humanity as such is simply the capacity to take a rational interest in something : to decide under the influence of reason that something is desirable , that it is worthy of pursuit or realization, that it is deemed to be important or valuable not because it contributes to survival or instinctual satisfaction, but as an end for its own sake. It is this capacity that the formula of Humanity commands us never to treat as a means, but always as an end in itself.”1 In Korsgaard’s conception our rationality consists in setting ends, or in determining what ends to pursue in order to flourish or achieve well-being. However, this conception of our rationality as agents leads to a “universalization” problem. Even if it is granted that I must respect my own rational nature as the source of my goals, why must I also respect this capacity for setting ends in others? Couldn’t an egoist, using his rational capacity, come to the conclusion that certain of his goals were more important than other people’s? One may respond that in failing to respect the rational capacity of others, he can no longer value his own goals as deriving from the rational capacity in him. But the exercise of his reasoning tells him that his goals are more important than other people’s. Hence if he respects the reasoning capacity of others over his own goals, then he is disrespecting his own reasoning capacity. I do not want to suggest that the “universalization” problem is insoluble . I do suggest that in Korsgaard’s understanding of Kant it becomes the crucial issue in validating a categorical imperative in terms of the 229 1. Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 114. formula of humanity.2 It is noteworthy that Kant himself sees no such problem or issue. Immediately, without any consideration, Kant equates respect for rationality in others with respect for one’s own rational nature . What is a thorny, difficult, and crucial issue for Korsgaard seems to be no issue at all for Kant. This suggests that Kant is working with a quite different conception of rationality, one according to which there simply is no “universalization” problem. Further evidence that the second formulation of the categorical imperative is not based on Korsgaard’s conception of rationality (as the source of our goals and values for flourishing in life) comes from Kant’s belief that the second formulation is straightforwardly equivalent to the first formulation in terms of universal willing. But now the first formulation (to allow only those maxims that can also be willed as universal laws) doesn’t on the face of it have anything to do with a conception of rationality as the source of our ends. It seems rather to turn on some sort of “contractualist” conception of rationality as universal agreement, or what is acceptable as a universal law. Since Kant believes that the equivalence of the two formulations is straightforward, it would seem that the second formulation in terms of humanity as an end should turn on the very same conception of rationality as the first does. Finally, Korsgaard’s view does not sit well with the fact that in passage after passage, in the Foundations and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant characterizes setting goals or ends as being pathological or heteronomous in contrast to the autonomy of our rational nature. All of this suggests that the Korsgaard’s conception of rationality is simply not Kant’s conception at all. I wish to contend rather that Kant is a contractualist , and that contractualism is what is expressed in all three formulations of the categorical imperative. Further, Kant’s defense of contractualism depends on his denying Korsgaard’s view that autonomous rationality is the source of our goals for flourishing. These contentions, I hope to show, explain why there is no “universalization” problem in Kant’s second formulation, why he thought it was so obvious that the second formulation is equivalent to the first, and why he goes out of his way to contrast rationality with seeking well-being or happiness. 2. the first formulation...

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