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4 Categories, Logical Functions, and Schemata in Kant In the first edition Transcendental Deduction of the categories Kant does not mention the logical functions of judgment. In the second edition (the B edition), the Deduction can be said to be dominated by the logical functions of judgment. A transcendental deduction supplies a method for showing that pure concepts can have applicability. My contention is that the two deductions constitute exactly the same method, and so are the exact same deduction.1 The difference between them, rather, is in the characterization of the pure concepts that the method is supposed to be a method for. The categories of the A edition become the logical functions together with their schemata in the B edition. This doesn’t mean that Kant has split the A edition notion of categories , since the A edition categories are equivalent to just the schemata themselves. The B edition simply adds the logical functions to the A characterization of the pure concepts. The rationale for this addition is that Kant’s radically new theory of cognition had so changed the notion of judgment or thought that the issue of the relation of judgment, thus newly understood, to logical reasoning was called into question. I believe that the picture I shall present clarifies not only the structure of the B edition Deduction but the nature of the Metaphysical Deduction and the Schematism as well. 1. the transcendental deduction in the a edition In the first of what Kant calls the preparatory sections of the Deduction , he characterizes objective cognition or objective representation as cognition that involves a constraint that “prevents our modes of knowl47 1. For references to a pervasive counterview that the B Deduction constitutes a significant departure, see Peter Baumanns, “Kants transzendentale Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe (B),” Kant-Studien 82 (1991): 329–48, and 83 (1992): 60–83. edge from being haphazard or arbitrary” (A104, p. 134).2 Kant holds that this constraint cannot be from an object outside our sensible representations . I believe that such objects, for Kant, would have to be represented purely conceptually or descriptively,3 a kind of representation Kant had allowed in the Inaugural Dissertation but soon after came to reject. In any case, Kant locates the constraint, rather, in rules for sensible representations (A105, p. 135). My actual sensible representations or reactions may be constrained by a rule of how it is proper or legitimate to react. Indeed, how I actually react may agree (correspond) or not with a rule of how it is proper to be reacting. This “unity” of reactions (sensible representations) under a rule is equally a necessary unity , since a rule unifies according to how it is required or necessary to proceed. Objective unity, in thus being identified with rule unity, is said by Kant to be “nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness” (A105, p. 135), or “nothing but the necessary unity of consciousness” (A109, p. 137). The unity of a rule, I suggest, is the unity of apperception .4 Our cognitions or thoughts, that is, are rules, so that the unity of our intellectual or cognitive consciousness in regard to the sensible is in terms of rules for proper sensible reactions. Thus, without going outside sensible representations (appearances), Kant has imported intellectual or objective representation into the sensible realm, by equating it with rules for reacting. In the second of the preparatory sections of the Deduction (A111– 14, pp. 138–40) Kant introduces the idea of one single experience, or one and the same general experience (A110, p. 138), to which all possible perception belongs. Rules enable us not only to constrain our actual reactions but to extend cognition beyond actual experience altogether . Thus it may have been proper to react in such and such a way a long time ago (before my birth), even though such reaction is completely beyond my actual experience. Kant is saying here that not only do we cognize objectively but we cognize a world extending way beyond the course of actual experience. All possible appearances, Kant says, must stand in relation to apperception (A111, p. 139). My present cognitive ability,5 that is, must encompass a set or repertoire of rules that 48 the transcendental deduction 2. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Boston: Bedford , 1965). All references are to this edition. 3. For the inadequacy of descriptive representation, see Essay 10 in this volume. 4. At A119, p. 143, Kant identifies the unity...

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