Changing Unjust Laws Justly: Pro-Life Solidarity with "The Last and Least"

10. An Overview and Conclusion

1 0 . A N O V E RV I E W A N D C O N C L U S I O N How is it possible to speak of the dignity of every human being when the killing of the weakest and the most innocent is permitted? In the name of what justice is the most unjust of discriminations practiced: some individuals are held to be deserving of defence and others are denied that dignity? John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, n. 20 If a society is unwilling to recognize the right to life of all the unborn and to prohibit all abortions, it may nevertheless be willing to prohibit some abortions—in particular, late abortions and those undertaken for what some regard as insufficiently serious reasons. As Chapter 1 described, unborn children with a mental or physical disability, or conceived after rape or incest, or in the earlier stages of development, or expected to cause serious problems to their mother’s health or life, tend to be excluded from restrictive abortion legislation, because society tends to be more approving of abortion for these children. This view is borne out not only by the experience of the pro-life movement in the United Kingdom but also by experiences in other countries. For example , the Polish abortion law, enacted in 1993 with the support of prolife legislators, prohibited most abortions that had been previously allowed , but it made an exception for unborn children who might be born with a serious and permanent disability, were conceived after rape, or posed a serious danger to their mother’s health. And, as the Introduction noted, U.S. state legislatures might be faced with votes for such legislation if Roe v. Wade is overturned and responsibility for abortion laws devolves to individual states. The principal problem of restrictive abortion laws is not simply that they fail to protect all unborn 317 children but that “the last and least” are excluded and the principle of solidarity is violated. Chapter 1 provided a practical demonstration of attempts to restrict abortion in the United Kingdom. Public arguments and the adoption of certain strategies are normally necessary for the successful enactment of legislation on any matter. Chapter 1 demonstrated that the arguments and strategies adopted by pro-life legislators and campaigning organizations in the UK to gain support for restrictive legislative proposals further marginalized “the last and least,” who were in any case marginalized by their exclusion from the proposals. It might be objected that the account in Chapter 1 merely demonstrates the pro-life movement’s need to be more circumspect in its statements and actions when supporting restrictive legislation. This, however, would be to miss the point that even if pro-life legislators and campaigners were to proclaim unequivocally their opposition to all abortions, their actions of excluding some unborn children from protection would contribute to society’s prejudice that such abortions are less, if at all, objectionable. And if the restrictive legislation itself is not consistent with pro-life principles, and is being supported for pragmatic reasons, then it is hardly surprising if those supporting it say and do things, as I described , which are similarly pragmatic and inconsistent with true principles . With Pope John Paul II we can ask: “How is it possible to speak of the dignity of every human being when the killing of the weakest and the most innocent is permitted [sinitur]”? How could legislators and pro-life campaigners in Poland speak of the dignity of every human being while simultaneously supporting the enactment of the purportedly “pro-life” 1993 restrictive law that allows abortion if the unborn child has been conceived after rape or incest, or would be born with a serious and permanent disability, or for other specified reasons? How could British legislators and pro-life campaigners speak of the dignity of every human being while simultaneously supporting the purportedly “pro-life” restrictive legislation introduced by David Alton, MP, described in Chapter 1, which would have allowed abortions generally up to 18 weeks, though in some instances, notably if the unborn child were disabled, at a later stage? 318 magisterial teaching and a conclusion With John Paul II, we can also ask: “In the name of what justice is the most unjust of discriminations practiced: some individuals are held to be deserving of defence and others are denied that dignity?” The question of changing abortion...