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Chapter 12 NATURE AS A METAPHYSICAL OBJECT General Considerations A paper on nature as a metaphysical object1 is, as we shall see, a paper on essence.2 Is there anything more to say about essence? Essence had a difficult time in the twentieth century, when the insistence was decidedly on existence. It might be wise to begin with a reminder of essence’s right to “equal time.” Since there are actually metaphysicians “out there” who think of essence as a mere limit on actual existence, or as a metaphysical item only needed to make possible the existence of creatures, beings other than the supreme being,3 perhaps the best recommendation of es1 . By “a metaphysical object” I mean what is a proper target of attention of the science of metaphysics; thus, in ST 1.11.3.ad 2, Thomas, speaking of the “one” which is interchangeable with “a being,” calls it “quoddam metaphysicum,” in contrast to the “one” which is the principle of number; this latter, he says, is “de genere mathematicorum.” In CM 5.5 (808), he carefully explains how “natura,” as said of all substance, pertains to first philosophy , just as does “substance,” taken in all its universality. At the outset of his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics Thomas lists among the orders with which reason has to do, the order of natural things. He says: There is a certain order which reason does not make, but only considers: such as is the order of natural things [ordo rerum naturalium]. [In Eth. 1.1 (1).] And he goes on to list the diverse sciences which relate to the various orders mentioned. As regards the order of natural things, he says: ......to natural philosophy it pertains to consider the order of things which human reason considers but does not make: we are taking “natural philosophy” as including within it also metaphysics [ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et metaphysicam]. [In Eth. 1.1 (2).] 2. ST 1.60.1 (ed. Ottawa, 362b5–7): ......nature is prior to intellect, for the nature of each thing is its essence. 3. In his book Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne, Paris, 1960: Vrin, looking for the basis for the possibility of having beings other than God himself, Étienne Gilson tells us: The difficulties to be surmounted are particularly serious in a theology like this one, where the first Cause transcends the order of essence. Indeed, it is a matter of understanding how essences can emanate from the being in which no distinctive essence is added to the esse to form a composition with it? This way of posing the question should, 205 sence we can provide is its status in the case of God. Suffice it to say, then, that while in God the subsisting thing, the essence, and the act of being are one simple identical item, nevertheless that simple item verifies what is proper to each: inasmuch as God is not in another, he is a subsisting thing; inasmuch as he has whatness, he is an essence; and inasmuch as he is, actually, he is the act of being.4 Indeed, what we call “essence” in creatures exists by priority in God, and exists there in a higher way: essence is most truly essence in God.5 The word “nature” has many meanings. Aristotle presented a whole series of meanings of “phusis” in Metaphysics 5.6 Boethius also had occasion to leave us a set of meanings of “natura,” the most relevant Latin besides, suffice to allow us to see in what direction the answer must be sought. If one located God in the order of essence, even at its summit, it would become extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to find outside of God a place for the world of creatures.......But we begin here with the notion of a God entirely transcending the order of essences, which includes the totality of creatures, whence one can infer that no problem of addition or subtraction will arise as between him and the being he creates. [170–171; my italics; the question-mark is Gilson’s] And toward the end of the meditation, he tells us: The property of essence [Le propre de l’Essence], finite mode of participating in being, is to render possible the existence of a natura rerum which is neither nothing nor God [198, my italics]. Thus, it is clear that the word “essence,” for Gilson, means properly a finite participation in being. Of course, one can say...

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