In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Essay 13 REASON AND PRINCIPLE IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY Perhaps the best approach to the Chinese conception of reason is to focus on the concept of li, commonly translated as “principle,” “pattern ,” or sometimes “reason.” While these translations in context are perhaps the best, explicating the uses of li is desirable and instructive for understanding some of the main problems of Chinese philosophy. Because there is no literal English equivalent, one cannot assume that li has a single, easily comprehensible use in Chinese discourse. This assumption is especially problematic in appreciating the basic concerns of Confucian ethics. A closer examination of the uses of li and “principle” reveals a complexity that cannot be captured by a simple formula. Apart from the question whether li and “principle” are functionally equivalent , one may also ask whether li in Confucian ethics can be properly considered a context-independent notion in the way that “principle” can. For a contemporary Confucian moral philosopher, Confucian ethics is more plausibly viewed as a form of virtue ethics.1 Absent an explanation of the uses of li, the translation of li as “principle” unavoidably leads to such misleading questions as: What are the principles of Chinese or Confucian ethics? If such principles exist, do they serve as premises for the derivation of moral rules? Are Confucian principles universal or relative? While these questions are fundamental in Western moral theory, their importance for Confucian ethics depends on a prior consideration of the status of principles in Confucian ethics.2 Difficulties also arise with the translation of li as “pattern.” Again we need to have some clear answers to such questions as: What sort of pat303 1. See my “The Conceptual Framework of Confucian Ethical Thought,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 23, no. 2 (1996): 153–74. For a more extensive discussion, see my Moral Vision and Tradition: Essays in Chinese Ethics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998), Essay 13. 2. See my “The Status of Principles in Confucian Ethics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16, nos. 3–4 (1989): 273–96; or Moral Vision and Tradition, Essay 14. tern? Are these patterns natural or artificial, that is, products of human invention? If they are natural, how do we go about finding them? More important, even if we regard “principle” or “pattern” as an acceptable rendering of li, we still need to explore its role in ethical argumentation .3 Such an inquiry presupposes that we have some understanding of the uses of li in Chinese ethical discourse. This essay is a tentative, highly selective treatment of li. It is an attempt to provide an ideal explication or constructive interpretation of li from the perspective of Confucian moral philosophy. Section 1 deals with the basic uses of li as a generic term. Section 2 discusses the function of li-binomials and the significance of principled interpretation of some basic notions of Confucianism . 1. basic uses of ‘li’ For pursuing the study of li, Tang Junyi’s pioneering study is a most valuable guide, particularly for the place of li in the history of Chinese thought.4 Also instructive is Wing-tsit Chan’s essay on the conceptual evolution of the Neo-Confucian notion of li.5 As a preliminary, following Xunzi,6 let us distinguish between li as a single term, that is, a single Chinese character or graph (danming), and li as a constituent element of a compound term (jianming), say, a binomial term, for example, wenli . For resolving problems of ambiguity and vagueness in single terms, it is a common practice of modern Chinese and Western Sinologists to appeal to relevant binomials. This method of interpretation is widely used by modern Chinese translators/annotators of classical Chinese texts. In section 2, we will say more about this procedure. Among Pre-Qin Classical Confucian texts, only in Xunzi do we find extensive use of li as a single term or graph. In this text, we find about 85 occurrences of li with different uses. The descriptive use of li in the sense of pattern or orderly arrangement may be shown by using a libinomial wen-li, as Xunzi sometimes does. Since wen pertains to “(cultural ) refinement,” wen-li can properly be rendered as “cultural pattern .” Often, this descriptive use of li has normative import, that is, wenli has not only de facto but also de jure status. Chan points out that there 304 other studies in chinese philosophy 3. See my Ethical Argumentation: A Study...

Share