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Essay 6 THE POSSIBILITY OF ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE This essay is an inquiry into the nature and possibility of knowing dao in the Xunzi. First, I offer a reconstruction of Xunzi’s conception of dao as the object of ideal ethical knowledge, and on this basis sketch a Confucian thesis on ethical judgments, for convenience labeled “practical coherentism” (section 1). This thesis is elaborated by way of focusing on the role of mind (xin), that is to say, the nature and method of deliberation requisite to the formation of sound ethical judgments (section 2). I conclude this study with suggestions for dealing with some problems in developing and defending practical coherentism (section 3). 1. ‘dao’ as the object of ethical knowledge For an explication of dao as the object of ideal ethical knowledge (zhi) in the Xunzi, I shall make use of Xunzi’s distinction between generic and specific terms (gongming and bieming).1 To a large extent, we may employ the recent, functionally analogous distinction of concept and conception.2 A generic term is a formal, general, abstract term amenable to specific uses in different contexts of discourse. These uses in theoretical or practical contexts may be said to be specific terms in the sense that they specify the significance of the use of the generic term adapted to the current purpose of discourse.3 Alternatively, we 138 1. This distinction is employed in my Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsün Tzu’s Moral Epistemology (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 121–25. 2. For the distinction between concept and conceptions, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 5–9; Robin Attfield, “On Being Human,” Inquiry 14 (1974): 175–76; suggested by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 15. For recent use and elaboration, see Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 71–72; and Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 9–10. 3. As Chen Daqi remarks, this distinction between gongming and bieming is a relative may say that there are various degrees or levels of abstraction or specification in the use of generic terms. Thus a generic term in one context may function as a specific term in another context, whenever the current purpose requires such further specification. In the language of concept and conception, a generic term designates a concept that can be used in developing various conceptions. In ancient Chinese thought, dao is a term of art, in the Greek sense of techne, used by different schools (jia) for propounding competing solutions to the common problem of ordering the state and personal life.4 In the Xunzi, dao is often used as a generic term (gongming) for a holistic ethical vision, the ideal standard of thought, speech, and action.5 Dao may be elucidated by way of focusing on two sets of specific terms (bieming ), pertaining respectively to the subject matter and the epistemic character of coherence. Dao may be characterized in terms of ren (benevolence), li (ritual propriety), and yi (rightness). Consider the following : The dao of the former [sage] kings is the magnificent display of ren (ren zhi long ye), for they follow what is fitting and appropriate (zhong). What is meant by the fitting and the appropriate? It is li and yi. The dao is neither the dao of Heaven nor the dao of the Earth. It is the dao humans [should] use as a guide to conduct , the dao the superior man (junzi) follows. (ruxiao L131)6 The Possibility of Ethical Knowledge 139 distinction rather than an exclusive disjunction. However, it is important not to construe the distinction in terms of class inclusion as Chen does. See Chen Daqi, Xunzi xueshuo (Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua she, 1954), 125–26. 4. As Graham succinctly states, “The crucial question for all of them is not the Western philosopher’s question ‘What is the truth?’ but ‘where is the Way [dao]?’, the way to order the state and conduct personal life” (A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Arguments in Ancient China [La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989], 3. But this central concern cannot be construed as a lack of interest in factual truth. Graham offers an instructive sinological treatment of this issue in Appendix 2 of the work cited. At any rate, the concern with factual truth (fuyan) is...

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