The Augustinian person

1. The Soul and Body

. Hubertus R. Drobner, Person-Exegese und Christologie bei Augustinus: Zur Herkunft der Formel “una Persona” (Leiden: E. J. Brill, ), – n. . . For the trichotomy see Fid. et Symb. ., .; Conf. ..–..; Tr. in Ioh. Ev. .; De Trin. .., ..; CD .. For the dichotomy see Mus. ..; Ep. ., ..; Conf. ..; Ench. .; and again Tr. in Ioh. Ev. .; CD ..        T H E S O U L A N D B O DY ;It has been argued that although Augustine on occasion divides human nature into three parts—spirit (or mind), soul, and body—this division is a mere ecclesiastical relic in his thought; and that his more fundamental division of our nature is into two—soul and body.1 But in fact both the trichotomy and the dichotomy are fundamental to his thought on the subject throughout his career.2 Moreover, there is no disjunction between them: they are simply versions of the same conception of human nature. We consist of body and soul, but the soul has two main aspects, the mental and the animative, so we can also be said to consist of body, soul, and mind (Tr. in Ioh. Ev. .; CD .). It is no contradiction of the latter formulation to say that the most basic question of Augustine’s anthropology is how he conceives of the relationship between soul and body. On this most basic question it would leave a false impression to restrict oneself to a single approach. Augustine himself does not do so. In the Literal Commentary on Genesis, for example, when he considers the origin of the soul in terms of its place in the universal hierarchy, he takes the preexistence of the human soul as the hypothesis more probable than any other (GL .., ..); a few chapters later, when he discusses the origin of the soul with reference to the transmission  of original sin, that “more probable” hypothesis recedes into the background and the rival theories are taken more seriously (GL ..–..). Thus his presentation of the fundamentals of human nature changes, though not necessarily beyond consistency, when a different phase of human existence provides the context. The central question in the first (the major) part of this chapter is how, if at all, Augustine’s idea of the relationship between soul and body allows him to think of a human being as one substance. (Here Robert J. O’Connell’s assertion that for Augustine all human souls are in a fallen condition by sheer virtue of having bodies will be especially in question.)3 For this discussion Augustine’s notion of the different phases of human existence (Creation, this world, and Eternity) provides a series of contexts. And although he notoriously remained undecided as to whether we all inherit our souls from Adam by generation , a study of his treatment of that question will nevertheless be crucial to the argument of this chapter. Our two special problems (the nature of sexual differentiation and that of individuality) will be discussed separately at the end of the chapter. For this area of Augustine’s thought the Neoplatonic background is especially important. Agaësse and Solignac point out that he follows Plotinus not only in regarding the body as the soul’s instrument (a point also repeatedly emphasized by Gilson) but also in placing the soul above the body in a hierarchy of which God is the supreme term: “the soul exceeds every physical creature,” says Augustine, “just as God exceeds every creature—by nobility of nature” (GL ..).4 But this similarity with Plotinus highlights the main problem entailed in a duality of body and soul. Just as for Plotinus the One is absolutely unknowable, as no other real being is, so for Augustine the difference between God and Creation is absolutely a difference in kind; but to conceive analogously (as they both do) of the    ⁄  . Robert J. O’Connell, S.J., The Origin of the Soul in St. Augustine’s Later Works (New York: Fordham University Press, ), . . Agaësse and Solignac, :; Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine , trans. L. G. M. Lynch (New York: Random House, ), , . soul’s relationship with the body is arguably to make an analogously sharp division through human nature—to deny implicitly that there is one human nature. For Plotinus himself the soul does not, in its true reality, participate in the life of a physical human being but gives rise to such a being out of a combination of something entirely physical , though expressly qualified for...