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27. On Providence
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52 ST. AUGUSTINE 26. ON THE DIVERSITY OF SINS There are sins of weakness, others, of ignorance, others, of malice. Weakness is the opposite of strength, ignorance is the opposite of wisdom, and malice is the opposite of goodness. Consequently whoever knows what is the strength and wisdom of God can judge which are the pardonable sins. And whoever knows what is the goodness of God can appreciate which sins are due some kind of punishment both in this world and in the one to come. Once these matters have been adequately treated, one can plausibly determine those who are not to be compelled to a penance full of sorrow and mourning, although they acknowledge their,sins, and those for whom no salvation whatever is to be hoped except they offer in sacrifice to God a spirit broken through penance. 1 27. ON PROVIDENCE Through an evil man Divine Providence can both punish and succor. For the impiety of the Jews was the Jews' downfall and yet provided salvation for the Gentiles. Again, Divine Providence through a good man can both condemn and help, as the Apostle says: "To some we are the scent of life unto life, but to others we are the scent of death unto death."1 But every tribulation is either a punishment of the impious or a testing of the just (hence the word tribulation is derived from tribula ["threshing sledge"]' an instrument which cuts up the chaff as well as separates the grain from the chaff). Further, peace and quiet from disruptive times can both profit the good and corrupt the evil. Therefore Divine Providence governs and tempers all these things in proportion to the worth of souls. But, nevertheless, the good do not choose for themselves the beneficial ministry of tribulation, nor do the evil love peace. For that reason the 1 Cf. Ps 50(51).19 1 2 Cor 2.16. QUESTION 27 53 evil also, as unknowing agents, receive the recompense, not of the justice which belongs to God, but the recompense of their own evil wills. Likewise, neither is there charged to the good the harm which is done to someone in their desire to do good. Rather, the good souP is rewarded on the basis of its good will. So too the remainder of creation, either openly or hidden from view, hinders or helps in proportion to the worth of rational souls.3 For since the highest God governs well all that he has made, there is nothing disordered and nothing unjust in the world, whether we know this or not. But the sinful soul, for its part, suffers misfortune. Still, because it is deservedly in the state befitting such a being, and because it suffers that which it is reasonable for such a being to suffer, the sinful soul does not mar by its deformity any of God's sovereign rule. Accordingly, since we do not know everything which the Divine Order does on our behalf, in respect to the goodwill alone do we act in conformity to the law. In other respects, however, we are acted upon in conformity to the law, since the law itself remains unchangeable and directs all changeable things by a supremely beautiful government. Therefore, "glory to God on high, and on earth peace to men of good will."4 2 bono animo. St. Augustine uses two words in this Q. which I translate indifferently here by the word soul. The words are animus and anima, which at times appear to have fairly distinct but related meanings in St. Augustine's thought. When a distinction is made, anima generally refers to the animating principle common to all physical life, man included. The term animus, however, refers specifically to the kind of anima or life-principle possessed by man, viz., a rational life-principle. (Cf. Gilson, Introduction a l'etude de Saint Augustin [Paris 1949], p. 56, n. 1, and his numerous references to appropriate texts from Augustine.) However, Augustine recognizes that even the term anima by itself can bear these two meanings. CF. Q. 7, "What does 'Soul' properly Refer to in a Living Being?" Although anima and ammus in Q. 27 can probably be translated by soul and mind respectively, nonetheless, I have here translated the two terms by the word soul, principally because the mea~ings of the two Latin words are more closely related than they are distinct, and because the English term soul better captures that common meaning than...