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BOOK NINETEEN Chapter 1 [IROM THIS POINT ON, I see that I must discuss the appointed ends of the two cities of earth and of heaven. But first I must set forth, within the limits which my work allows, the kind of philosophical efforts men have made in their search for happiness amid the sorrows of this mortal life. My purpose is, first, to point out the difference between their hollow aspirations and the holy assurances which God has given us; second, to make clear what is meant by the true beatitude which He will grant. For this latter purpose I shall appeal not only to divine Revelation but to such natural reasoning as will appeal to those who do not share our faith. In regard to what is supremely good and supremely evil, philosophers have taken many different stands-all striving with the highest earnestness to determine what it is that makes men happy. By definition, our supreme end is that good which is sought for its own sake, and on account of which all other goods are sought. In the same way, the supreme evil is that on account of which other evils are 183 184 SAINT AUGUSTINE avoided, whereas it is to be avoided on its own account. For the moment, we shall say that the ultimate good is not so much a good to end all goods as, rather, one by which goodness reaches its fullest consummation. In the same way, the ultimate evil is not one in which evil comes to an end, but the one in which evil reaches the very height of harm.1 It is in this sense that the greatest good and the worst evil are called ends or ultimates. To determine what these ultimates are and then, in this life, to obtain the supreme good and avoid the supreme evilsuch has been the aim and effort of all who have professed a zeal for wisdom in this world of shadows. Of course, for all their aberrations, the nature of man has set limits to men's deviations from the right track, seeing that the ultimate good and evil must be found either in the soul, or in the body, or in both.2 It was under these three general heads that Marcus Varro, in his work, On Philosophy, listed the immense variety of opinions which he examined with such careful and subtle scrutiny; he remarked that, by the application of various differentiating notes, he could easily reach no less than 288 possible species of opinions-not, of course, that there were that many schools in existence. For the purpose of my exposition, I shall begin with an observation of Varro in the work just mentioned, namely, that there are four ends which men naturally pursue, irrespective of any teacher, formal education, or training in that purposeful art of living which we call virtue, and which is indubitably a matter of learning. These ends are: first, pleasure aroused by the pleasant stirring of our bodily senses; second, calm, in the sense of the absence of all bodily vexation; third, that com1 Finem bani . . . dicimus, non quo consumatur ut non sit, sed quo perficiatur ut plenum sit ... finem mali 'non quo esse desinat, quo usque 'nocendo perducat. 2 Cf. above, 8.1. THE CITY OF GOD: BOOK XIX 185 bination of pleasure and serenity which Epicurus called, in single word, pleasure; fourth, the primary demands of nature3 which include, besides pleasure and calm, such needs of our body as wholeness, health, security, and such nc:.eds of our soul as man's innate spiritual powers, whether great or small. These four-pleasure, serenity, their combination, and the primary exigencies of nature-are so much a part of us that it is either on their account that we pursue the virtue which education brings us; or else they are sought on account of virtue; or else these four and virtue are sought, each on its own account. Hence, we get twelve schools of thought, since each of the four ends can be looked at in three ways. A single illustration will make this whole matter clear. Take bodily pleasure. This can be either subordinated or preferred or merely joined to virtue in the soul. Hence, we get three different schools of thought. Pleasure is subordinate to virtue when it is a means to the practice of virtue. For example , it is a part of virtue to live in one's native land and...

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