Voices from the Vietnam War: Stories from American, Asian, and Russian Veterans

Conclusion: Perspectives on the War

Conclusion Perspectives on the War The cold war globalized the Vietnam War, leading a number of countries to send forces to support either the Communist North or the anti-Communist South. For both sides, the international contributions became part of their efforts for victory. By 1968, Communist military cooperation had made the PLAF and NVA stronger and more capable of attacking the U.S. and ARVN units in the South. In the meantime, however, China demonstrated the limits to its cooperation when its army suddenly terminated military operations and withdrew all of its troops from Vietnam. Chinese leaders never considered military cooperation a separate issue from their relationship with the Russians. The stories reveal how the American escalation put more pressure on the Communist coalition and worsened relations between Beijing and Moscow. Hanoi recognized the competition between Moscow and Beijing for the leadership in the Asian Communist movement. Each claimed a position as a key supporter of the Vietnamese Communists’ struggle against the American invasion. The Vietnamese welcomed both Chinese and Soviet troops into North Vietnam, increasing the competition between the two Communist giants. American intelligence never fully understood the nature and seriousness of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Intelligence chiefs had predicted a possible improvement in the relationship between Moscow and Beijing during the Vietnam War. In September 1965, a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) argued that with rapidly increasing demands for air defense in North Vietnam, “China will need Soviet support and protection. Greater Soviet involvement might reluctantly be desired to deter the U.S. This is an additional factor likely to promote a constructive resolution of previous Sino-Soviet frictions over the speed, scope, and method of aiding Hanoi and bolstering South China bases.”1 It is evident in these chapters that the Chinese and Soviet air defenses in North Vietnam against America’s Rolling Thunder air campaign did not 224 Voices from the Vietnam War improve their relations. Chinese and Russian officers never united to support Vietnam, which instead became another battleground between the two contesting Communist states. To obtain the maximum material support for its war effort, the DRV tried to maintain a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. The serious competition between the Chinese and Soviets generated more material , financial, and military technology with which the PLAF and NVA could modernize their forces. According to the stories, one of the primary advances in Viet Cong military organization was the establishment of local units based on village structure to mobilize the peasants in the South. Even though the Viet Cong was rich in manpower, the peasant soldiers were illiterate and poorly trained. The PLAF’s command structure was chaotic, and often favored personal relationships and local interests. In the mid1960s , however, the Viet Cong incorporated many new factors into their military organization, including Russian and Chinese arms and Northern officers to train the peasant soldiers. In addition, the PLAF troops gained battlefield experience. By the Tet Offensive of 1968, the PLAF and NVA had experienced some important transformations in terms of command, organization, operation, logistics, and training in South Vietnam. Some of this book’s accounts reflect how the PLAF and NVA changed from a peasant , guerrilla army into a regular army by expanding its operations. The Viet Cong command shifted from local to regional defense, from small- to large-scale operations that became more offensive and aggressive in nature. As the war progressed, more and more local troops joined major operations with North Vietnamese troops. Another important factor was that large numbers of the Northern Communist troops, including some of the best NVA units, infiltrated into the South through the 1960s. A few chapters reinforce evidence that these troops were trained and armed by the Chinese and Russians. Many of their officers were seasoned veterans of the French Indochina War and familiar with the South. The NVA command eventually replaced the PLAF command in South Vietnam in the late 1960s, and after the Tet Offensive the PLAF was integrated with the NVA. Between 1963 and 1975, the NVA and PLAF mobilized more than 8 million Communist troops against the United States, ARVN, and their allies. They suffered an estimated 4 million casualties, including 1 million military deaths.2 The Vietnamese Communist forces had previously fought in wars against Japan and France, but they knew little about American forces. The Conclusion 225 combat experience the NVA gained against the U.S. forces bolstered...