Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War

3. Opening Pandora's Box: Escalation and Domestic Politics, 1965–1966

79 chapter 3 Opening Pandora’s Box Escalation and Domestic Politics, 1965–1966 Decide: To succumb to the preponderance of one set of influences over another set. —Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary It is always thus, impelled by a state of mind which is destined not to last, that we make our irrevocable decisions. —Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past For Lyndon Johnson, the operative mythological characters in 1965 were not Scylla and Charybdis or Cassandra, but rather Pandora. According to Greek myth, the gods gave Pandora a box with instructions not to open it. Before too long, however, curiosity overcame her, and she opened the box, unleashing havoc and all manner of evil on the world. It is unfortunate that Johnson did not heed the lessons of the ancient story. In choosing to escalate the Vietnam conflict into a full-scale Americanized (though undeclared) war, he took the United States from what some considered its golden age—the prosperity of the Cold War, the glamour of Camelot, and the preponderance of American power—into a much more uncertain era. This chapter will examine the decision the Johnson administration made to open the Pandora’s box of escalation during 1965, consider how the implementation of that policy irrevocably altered the course of American history, and assess the role played by both hawks and doves in the GOP in the process. 80 Vietnam’s Second Front From a domestic political standpoint, Lyndon Johnson had considerable room to maneuver after the 1964 election. In an unpublished book manuscript detailing his service in the administration, William Bundy argues that the president could have carried American public opinion with him “on whatever course he chose” with respect to Vietnam.1 While he would have taken political heat from GOP hawks like Nixon and Goldwater for abandoning South Vietnam in late 1964, it would not have been debilitating and would certainly have caused less consternation for him in the years to come than what ensued. It is also important to remember that the war was not a deeply divisive issue at this point. Opposition to the conflict remained embryonic, and no real consensus existed either in Congress or in the country on what to do. For Johnson, however, the pathological fear of a “who lost Vietnam” debate dominated his thinking, and decoupling the United States from South Vietnam—or at the very least disengaging militarily from the conflict—did not register as a realistic option. But, as H. W. Brands points out, the China analogy was not entirely accurate in this case. Truman’s narrow victory over Thomas Dewey in 1948 rendered him much more susceptible to the “slightest rocking of the boat” than did Johnson’s defeat of Goldwater. Given the magnitude of his landslide, LBJ “could have weathered a much larger storm without swamping.”2 Yet he had already decided in principle to escalate the war by the end of 1964, though some uncertainty lingered. Abandoning an American ally, particularly one facing an imminent Communist challenge, seemed inconceivable to him. In addition, while his mandate would allow him to pursue his comprehensive domestic legislative agenda, he did not want partisan sniping over the war to interfere with the Great Society. The best way, in his mind, to keep the Republicans at bay would be to strengthen the U.S. commitment to the survival of the Saigon regime and the defeat of communism in Southeast Asia. But Johnson also had to face increasing pressure from Republican doves. Most notably, John Sherman Cooper remained steadfast in his opposition to increased involvement in Vietnam in the months leading up to Johnson’s decision to Americanize the war. In January 1965, Cooper urged a reevaluation of U.S. policy based in part on the lack of fortitude demonstrated by the South Vietnamese government and military. As he told reporters, “If these people in South Vietnam will not stand and fight, I don’t see how we can stay there.”3 The administration worried about Cooper’s potential influence on Capitol Hill. One internal memo referred to him as a “bellwether” who could convince others to reconsider their support of the war and the administration.4 Another thorn in the administration’s side was George Aiken. He considered Vietnam as an unwinnable war that threatened to have devastating domestic consequences for the United States—high casualties, a weakened economy, a Opening Pandora’s Box 81...