In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

43 chapter 2 The Cassandra Conundrum GOP Opposition to LBJ’s Vietnam Policy, 1963–1965 Political skill is the ability to foretell what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month, and next year. And to have the ability afterwards to explain why it didn’t happen. —Sir Winston Churchill, The Churchill Wit Vietnam is sort of going to hell . . . while all the center of political energy of the Executive Branch is on the election . . . [LBJ’s] living with his own political survival every time he looks at those questions. —McGeorge Bundy quoted in Gordon M. Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster According to the Iliad, Cassandra, the daughter of King Priam of Troy, was so beautiful that the sun god, Apollo, became infatuated with her. After agreeing to become Apollo’s consort, Cassandra received the gift of prophecy, but before the relationship was consummated, she rejected him. Enraged that a mere mortal spurned his love, Apollo cursed Cassandra so that no one believed her predictions. The gift became an endless source of frustration and pain for her. During the war with the Greeks, her prophecies about the Trojan horse and the destruction of Troy were either ignored or not fully understood; some versions of the myth suggest that people believed her words to be the product of insanity, which caused them to dismiss her warnings out of hand. This chapter will consider the Cassandras of the American experience in Vietnam: Barry Goldwater, whose campaign statements foreshadowed U.S. policy in Southeast Asia after the 1964 election; Richard Nixon, whose aggressive comments boded 44 Vietnam’s Second Front ill for both the Johnson administration and his own; and John Sherman Cooper , whose dire warnings about the trajectory of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam and its attendant perils would also be realized. It will also examine the role played by domestic political considerations in postponing decisions about the war owing to the 1964 presidential election. Like most of his generation, Lyndon Johnson was a committed cold warrior who saw communism as an enemy that had to be defeated.1 More specifically, he came into office as a strong believer in the necessity of standing firm in Vietnam as a bulwark against communism in Asia and of supporting the Saigon regime fully. This stance also reflected his belief that Kennedy’s complicity in the coup that toppled Diem linked the fate of South Vietnam to the American commitment .2 Yet Johnson was also driven by a notion he shared with his predecessor —should South Vietnam fall, he would face a domestic political backlash that would fracture the support he required to implement his nascent Great Society programs.3 This sentiment would play a major role in every choice LBJ made leading up to the Americanization of the war. Not only would he base his decisions in significant measure on domestic political calculations, but he would also do everything he could to implicate the GOP in the process. In the aftermath of Kennedy’s death, Dwight Eisenhower called the White House and offered his advice and support. Johnson told Eisenhower, “I need you more than ever now.” To this Eisenhower replied, “Anytime you need me Mr. President, I will be there.”4 The next day, the former president drove to Washington from Gettysburg to meet with Johnson. He made a number of recommendations, including those in a memorandum hastily composed at Johnson’s request in which he left no doubts about where he believed the new administration should take the country in terms of both foreign and domestic policy. Although he did not follow many of Eisenhower’s suggestions, particularly those dealing with domestic issues, Johnson recalled in his memoirs, “I had tremendous respect for the opinions of this wise and experienced man who knew so well the problems of the burdens of the Presidency.”5 Like Kennedy, Johnson would rely heavily on his predecessor on the issue of Vietnam in the years to come, both for his foreign policy expertise and for domestic political cover. For the time being, Johnson made it clear to the nation and the world that he would continue Kennedy’s policies toward Vietnam. One of Johnson’s first acts as president was to reaffirm the American commitment to the Saigon regime. Drawing on the conclusions of the recently concluded policy conference in Honolulu, National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 273 essentially ratified the Kennedy administration’s position on Vietnam . It announced U.S. support for the new...

Share