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11 October Surprise With the clock ticking down on the Johnson administration, Clifford had convinced Johnson to make one last concerted effort to bring the war to a close. “When in doubt, do right,” Clifford had argued, and with some trepidation, Johnson had agreed. Even steadfast hawks Dean Rusk and Maxwell Taylor would soon come around. It had been an almost impossible task for Clifford to impose his will on Johnson, but through sheer perseverance he had carried the day. Unfortunately for Clifford, the South Vietnamese could not be persuaded to come to the bargaining table, and without two willing partners a peace settlement remained agonizingly out of reach. Clifford had been right when he warned that Vietnam would become a quagmire. While on the one hand there was progress, on the other there were setbacks. The North Vietnamese were displeased with a new condition that they seat an NLF delegation in Paris within twenty-four hours of a bombing halt, the United States having agreed to allow the NLF to participate in four-party negotiations: the governments of North and South Vietnam, the United States, and the NLF. The North Vietnamese wanted the talks to commence no later than a week after the bombing stopped, but the Americans considered a week too long, fearing that such a delay would undermine the morale of the South Vietnamese. The other problem , and the one with greater implications, was that inclusion of the NLF at the negotiating table conferred legitimacy to the group and was seen as an embarrassment to the South Vietnamese government. A few days later the South Vietnamese ambassador to the United States, Bui Diem, warned Walt Rostow that his government might not participate in peace talks if the NLF were in attendance. Further complicating the matter , the North Vietnamese wanted a joint communiqué announcing the bombing halt and the commencement of four-party talks. The American delegation rejected the request, preferring to characterize the peace talks October Surprise 315 as “our side–your side.”1 The differences, while technical, nonetheless represented obstacles that had to be resolved before substantive negotiations could begin. Discussing the status of the talks during a meeting with Johnson and his senior foreign policy advisers, Clifford voiced his frustration over the newly erected roadblocks. “There is a missing factor here,” he said. “I don’t know what happened since last week. . . . When I left here Monday, I thought we had a deal. On Tuesday, I learned we didn’t have a deal since the Paris delegation had to go back to Hanoi.” The misunderstandings regarding the peace talks over the previous week had been a “debacle,” he told the president. During the president’s weekly Tuesday lunch meeting the participants continued the discussion of the inclusion of the NLF at the peace talks. “Nixon will ask me if this isn’t like putting a fox in the chicken coop,” said Johnson. Rostow wondered whether the South Vietnamese government would even participate if the NLF was present, as Bui Diem had warned him. Clifford, however, believed that participating in the talks actually conferred legitimacy on the South Vietnamese government and that the participation of the NLF was more of a benefit than a detriment.2 Later in the day Johnson telephoned Clifford to discuss again the political ramifications of the bombing pause and peace talks, and Clifford reassured the president that it was the North Vietnamese who chose the timing. Clifford also reiterated his familiar argument that a bombing pause, even if unsuccessful, was necessary to demonstrate that the president did everything possible to secure a peaceful resolution to the conflict.3 October 27 brought news of a breakthrough in the negotiations when Cyrus Vance called to inform the White House that the North Vietnamese had dropped their last condition and agreed to commence the discussions on November 2, three days after the proposed bombing halt.4 Rusk detected the influence of the Soviets. “I smell vodka and caviar in it,” he said. The president, however, was unconvinced . “Why do we have to yield?” he asked. “They have made the major step,” Rusk replied. “If ten steps separated us,” Clifford added, “they have taken eight and we have taken two.” Rusk, unexpectedly, thought it was even better. “I would say it is nine to one,” he said. Johnson, however, remained unconvinced. “I still think this is a political move to affect this election,” he said. “Even if it were so,” Rusk replied, “it is in...

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