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10. I Search for Why I Find Myself Constantly Alone
- The University Press of Kentucky
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10 I Search for Why I Find Myself Constantly Alone “Tonight I want to speak to you of peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia,” President Johnson had declared on March 31, 1968; yet peace would prove to be elusive. Although he had publicly proclaimed his desire for peace during a primetime television address, and had sacrificed his political ambitions in the process, Johnson did not move decisively to bring the war to an end. The president’s vacillation, emotional outbursts , and unpredictable behavior were an endless source of frustration for Clifford, who could never be certain that he had the president’s support . In sending mixed messages Johnson also exacerbated the rivalry between Clifford and hawks Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, who continued to argue that America’s prestige and security were at stake in Southeast Asia. At times the bureaucratic infighting was vicious, as Clifford’s adversaries sought to discredit him in front of the president and disregarded his authority over the military. Although he had allies in the Pentagon and White House, among Johnson’s senior foreign policy advisers Clifford was very much alone. Having made the offer to seek peace with North Vietnam it was now up to Johnson to take the necessary steps to prove that he truly meant what he said. Almost immediately that situation was made more complicated. On April 1, the day after the president’s speech, U.S. warplanes bombed a military target in Thanh Hoa, just south of the 20th parallel. This immediately caused a political problem for Johnson, especially with Senator William Fulbright, because the president had been vague, promising that he would cease bombing north of the DMZ without specifying that the line had actually been drawn, as Clifford had suggested, at the 20th parallel. Although it was below the 20th parallel, Thanh Hoa was two 284 CLARK CLIFFORD hundred miles north of the DMZ. Johnson and his advisers met the next day and discussed whether to revise the orders and restrict bombing below the 20th parallel. Somewhat contradicting his position in favor of de-escalation, Clifford argued that they should continue to bomb up to the 20th parallel. “If we limit ourselves below 20th they will take advantage of it,” he said. He also indicated that he doubted that the enemy would be willing to engage in peace talks, thus raising questions regarding Clifford’s own intentions. “Odds are 100 to 1 Hanoi will turn us down,” he said. “Best thing we can do is to show a continuing effort.” He assured Johnson that the 20th parallel was the appropriate boundary because it left three-fourths of the land and 90 percent of the population of North Vietnam off limits while still inhibiting the North’s ability to move men and materiel into South Vietnam. He also observed that 90 percent of the sorties were within sixty miles of the DMZ, while only 2.3 percent were against targets in the Thanh Hoa area.1 The following day the North Vietnamese broadcast a statement over Hanoi radio responding to Johnson’s peace initiative. Initially it appeared that they had rejected Johnson’s offer, describing it as a “defeat and at the same time a shrewd trick.” However, the statement then veered from belligerency to accommodation: “However, for its part, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares its readiness to appoint its representative to contact the U.S. representative with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so that talks may start.”2 In the afternoon Johnson met with his Cabinet to discuss the North Vietnamese response. Abandoning his tone of pessimism from the previous day Clifford suggested that the North Vietnamese were willing to seek peace. “This appears to be a departure from [their] previous position about unconditional cessation of bombing,” he said, and recommended “that we construe this as a reciprocal step on the part of Hanoi and now proceed to the second part of the program that the President had in mind.”3 On April 4 the news reached Washington of a national tragedy, the first of two horrific losses for the country, the assassination of Martin Luther King. In the aftermath of the King assassination, Johnson canceled a previously scheduled trip to Vietnam to confer with Westmoreland, who would soon step down as U.S. commander in Vietnam. Instead, Westmoreland flew...