Hitler's Man in Havana: Heinz Luning and Nazi Espionage in Latin America

6. Their Man in Havana

123  6  their Man in Havana On October 25, 1942, Washington, D.C., police motorcycles escorted a vain Cuban chief of police, General Manuel Benítez, through the capital , for a meeting with J. Edgar Hoover. Benítez and Hoover basked in the light of photographers’ flashbulbs as they shared the glory of capturing Germany’s master spy in the Americas. They also shared a cover-up. Hoover knew, and Benítez should have known, that Lüning was not a master spy. He had never radioed German submarines, and British censors in Bermuda had done most of the work to catch him. Just over a month later, President Franklin D. Roosevelt would wine and dine Cuban president Fulgencio Batista, who was given the honor of spending a night in the White House as these two chief executives expanded the charade of the destruction of a major German spy network. In September 1942, Lüning was packaged as a key spy because the Allies needed to show aggressive, successful counteraction to the threat of defeat from the Nazi submarine campaign. His operational location in Havana, Cuba, near where more than six hundred Allied vessels were sunk in ten months of 1942, allowed the U.S., British, and Cuban counterintelligence agencies to shift much responsibility for these disastrous losses to Lüning. The counterintelligence agencies boasted of their imagined roles in Lüning’s arrest to garner credit for ending this bleeding of Allied shipping.1 Likewise, Allied counterintelligence expected recognition for its 124 Hitler’s Man in Havana (pretended) termination of this danger. Batista, Benítez, Braden, Hoover, and the SIS benefited from the capture of a faux major German spy. Hyping the arrest made it appear that Cuban intelligence and the SIS were curtailing the frequent U-boat sinkings of Allied vessels. Crushing the “most important” Nazi spy ring in the Americas might mitigate Allied reverses, which continued through 1942. Such news comforted the U.S. citizenry after a year of bad news from the Pacific, East Asian, European , North African, Atlantic, and Caribbean theaters. In reality, the Allied development of effective antisubmarine air patrols, better-trained flight and ship crews, and more antisubmarine surface vessels drove the U-boats away. Using Lüning’s capture as a starting point, Benítez and Batista obtained invitations to Washington, D.C., to reap rewards and gain prestige. The ambitious Benítez, who sought to succeed Batista, had prematurely arrested the spy and then released his identity to bolster his reputation and political position. To further enhance his standing, he claimed that several Cuban intelligence agents would undergo training in the FBI school in Virginia. Hoover tried to quash that brazen step. He announced that the FBI courses were only for FBI trainees and a few domestic policemen. For good measure, he added that the few courses scheduled were full. The FBI chief was placed in an awkward spot, however . Lüning’s arrest made Benítez appear as a diligent and loyal U.S. ally. There was no suitable way to avoid a visit from him. Ultimately, Hoover even allowed a few Cubans to attend the school.2 In late October 1942, Hoover salved Benítez’s ego. In addition to providing the motorcycle escort and the publicity photographs, Hoover praised the general’s role (nonexistent) in capturing Lüning. Hoover labeled the arrest of Lüning a “magnificent” piece of work; he judged it a case with positive ramifications throughout the hemisphere. The New York Times summarized Hoover’s praise: the Lüning case “probably would prove to be the outstanding spy case in the hemisphere.” Benítez was, actually, ineffective in counterespionage. He had, however, political sense. While in Washington, he praised the SIS’s work with Cuban officials. He boasted that the two nations had worked together on the Lüning case and had unraveled espionage connections to other parts of their Man in Havana 125 Latin America also. In public, he emphasized the broad-based Cuban support of the Allied war effort. He suggested that U.S.-Cuban cooperation would, ultimately, eliminate Axis espionage in the Americas. Benítez needed pampering because he was “inordinately vain, love[d] display, [and] Pomp and Circumstance.” To gratify his vanity, the FBI hosted a banquet in his honor, arranged a visit to the FBI academy, and set up a courtesy visit with General George C. Marshall. Nevertheless...