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277 conclusion Replacing France chaRleS De gaUlle FiRSt calleD for the “neutralization” of vietnam , whereby South and north vietnam would resolve their problems without external influence, in the summer of 1963. president Kennedy angrily responded by questioning de gaulle’s right to suggest such an action, noting that France had “neither armed forces, nor an economic aid program in vietnam,” and that the entire burden was being “shouldered by the United States.”1 true enough, but as the preceding chapters have shown, the reason France no longer had a military or economic presence was that Washington and Saigon had systematically pushed France out of vietnam. The burden the United States “shouldered” was not imposed, but chosen. a number of theories exist as to how and why early american involvement in vietnam occurred. The “quagmire thesis” holds that successive U.S. presidents gradually became entangled in the war by small steps, each convinced that a limited commitment would eventually lead to victory. The “stalemate thesis” asserts that U.S. involvement was a series of deliberate acts by presidents who saw the quagmire for what it was, but could not bring themselves to accept defeat while in office. Other scholars claim that the United States “stumbled” into vietnam.2 For the period under examination here, none of these descriptions apply. The truman, eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations did not slip into vietnam by inadvertence, nor did they deliberately use vietnam as a holding action. earlier interpretations have ignored the intra-alliance politics that were responsible, to a considerable degree, for increasing american intervention in vietnam. intra-alliance conflict among France, Britain, and the United States hindered, rather than helped, western policy in indochina. The three countries , while agreeing on common policies in theory—creating a coordinated Southeast asian defense, building a national vietnamese army, implementing the navarre plan, supporting South vietnamese prime minister ngo Dinh Diem, and encouraging consultations for the 1956 elections—never managed to carry through these policies in practice. The search for “common  Replacing France action” always appeared just out of reach. But in attempting to realize this goal, america increased its influence in vietnam, with the result that by 1960 the americans had replaced the French in almost all domains in South vietnam and dissuaded them from maintaining a presence in north vietnam. in the end, the western bloc as much as the communist one furthered the american commitment to a noncommunist South vietnam, as the american entrance onto the scene went hand-in-hand with the French exit. When exactly did this transfer occur? it is almost impossible to pinpoint an exact date or action. certainly no French politician wanted to assume responsibility for the French loss of control. Witness pierre mendès France’s defense that his administration could not be held accountable for the “relève,” or replacement of France by the United States. he argued that americans were already installed in Saigon long before he came to power, and that the French “eviction” was a result of previous governments trying to obtain additional american economic and military aid. Regarding the U.S. assumption of French duties, he noted France had “systematically” initiated the americans into first military and then civil and local affairs. according to mendès France, the “fundamental French error” was “introducing” the americans in the first place.3 This introduction, and the beginning of the transition from the French to the americans, began in earnest in 1950. chinese recognition of north vietnam and French success in portraying their war effort as an anticommunist crusade led to the first tentative american steps toward intervention. During numerous tripartite meetings from 1950 to 1953, French officials slowly but surely persuaded Washington of indochina’s importance as an outpost for western defense. Thus, efforts to coax the United States into seeing the French cause in indochina as an allied one were deliberate and longstanding . French success in convincing the United States not only to aid the French war effort but also to support a common Southeast asian defense policy paved the way for future american involvement. The portrayal of indochina as an international affair by successive French governments did, to a certain degree, backfire. paris found its liberty of action impeded as it coordinated with the Bao Dai government and the americans in the fight against the DRv. to be sure, the French underappreciated the various american missions and dignitaries sent to observe and aid the war effort. But constant american claims that independence [3.16...

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