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85  Negotiating toward Geneva aS a ReSUlt OF the BeRlin cOnFeRence, France now had a political end in sight to more than seven years of conflict in vietnam. however, its american ally was still focused on a military victory. intra-alliance politics played an important role in dictating how France and the United States proceeded in the months leading up to the geneva conference and at the conference itself, demonstrating the fragility of allied solidarity. Designed to settle the Korean and indochina conflicts, geneva would be the first major test not only of east-West but also of West-West negotiations on asian issues since Stalin’s death. Ultimately, allied solidarity failed at geneva as the accords left the door wide open for the United States and France to pursue separate policies in vietnam.1 Shortly after Berlin, the vietminh launched a major offensive against the French outpost at Dien Bien phu. in keeping with chinese foreign minister Zhou enlai’s advice that “in order to achieve a victory in the diplomatic field” they should emulate the chinese success on the eve of the Korean armistice by winning several battles in vietnam, the vietminh planned to strengthen their negotiating position at geneva through a major military victory.2 paris asked Washington to intervene unilaterally to lift the siege at Dien Bien phu, but the americans preferred to intervene multilaterally and suggested that a number of anticommunist countries join together against the vietminh. The British wanted no part in a multilateral military intervention. They feared that such a move would provoke a chinese invasion of vietnam and escalate the conflict into a major war before negotiations could begin at geneva. These differing goals prevented the French, americans, and British from developing a coordinated policy to save the French military effort at Dien Bien phu, resulting in the fall of Dien Bien phu on may 7—the day before the indochina phase of the geneva conference began. The geneva conferees had a number of agendas. The Soviets undoubtedly  Neither Communism nor Colonialism, 10–1 hoped to enhance international communist prestige through their support of china, the vietminh, and peaceful coexistence while sowing seeds of discord among the Western allies. at the same time, moscow also wanted to avoid further escalation of the Korean and indochina conflicts that could lead to full-scale world war.3 china planned to make the most of its first official international conference, whereas the exhausted vietminh wanted a cease-fire. The noncommunist nationalists in South vietnam were skeptical of the conference, expecting that the French would yield to DRv demands. The French, British, and americans all had different goals for the conference . The French were determined to settle the indochina conflict at the negotiating table and were prepared to go to great lengths to achieve peace; the americans wanted the French to keep fighting and avoid a settlement that gave away too much to the communists; and the British intended to resume their role as a world leader through their co-chairmanship of the conference with the Soviets and create a relaxation of tensions between east and West. From the beginning of the conference, western interests diverged widely, leaving the United States feeling increasingly isolated from its allies. Ultimately, the British and French agendas prevailed at geneva, leading the United States to the fateful decision that it could secure a noncommunist vietnam without France. United Action in early 1954, negotiations remained front and center as the laniel government focused all of its attention on geneva. a January visit to vietnam by French minister for the associated States marc Jacquet, and one in February by the minister of defense, René pleven, confirmed the overwhelming problems France faced in trying to continue the war. Their conclusion? negotiate . The laniel government recognized that France could not negotiate directly with the vietminh because France needed to tie the Soviet Union and china to the accords as well. according to French deputy prime minister paul Reynaud, china wanted peace in order to proceed with its domestic consolidation and hoped to receive concessions from the West for helping solve asian problems. The Soviets also advocated peace because they feared the expansion of chinese influence in Southeast asia. in addition, china and the USSR were worried about american intervention.4 Reynaud thus believed that the chinese and Soviets would not hinder a peaceful resolution to the indochina conflict. French foreign minister georges Bidault was not so sure. he worried that the communists would...

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