The Lotus Unleashed: The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam, 1964-1966

Conclusion: The Movement Defeated?

Conclusion The Movement Defeated? It might be of moment to western religious people, that a religious tradition exists in the east, before whose example their own churches are dim witness indeed. -Daniel Berrigan In the end, the Vien Hoa Dao saw its three-year campaign to end the war and protect the politically powerless citizenry ofSouthVietnam turned back by the police and military power of the GVN and the United States. Despite a brief period of self-doubt on their part, U.S. leaders soon increased American troop levels, resulting in more violence and greater distress for the Vietnamese and American people. Thus, Buddhist-inspired instability led to greater U.S. hegemony over the GVN and to an escalation of the fighting in a way that resulted in one of the great 'tiuman tragedies of the twentieth century. For the United States, the 1966 decision to stay the course put it on the road to a humiliating defeat in Vietnam. While the war represented a monumental social catastrophe for the Vietnamese, the United States also paid a heavy price with the emergence of severe political dissension and polarization at home, a general loss offaith in government, the breakdown of the Cold War foreign-policy consensus, a damaged economy, the extreme disillusionment of the soldiers who fought in the war, and close to 58,000 Americans killed. 143 The Lotus Unleashed The inability of American officials to acknowledge the presence of widespread Vietnamese nationalism as a potent recruiting tool for the NLF, and as the force behind the Buddhist movement, meant that chaos, anarchy, and war would dominate South Vietnam for years to come. Nevertheless, for a short period of time, a window of opportunity had opened for the Johnson administration to flee from its disastrous course in Vietnam. Ultimately, decision makers could not summon the will to recall U.S. forces and convince the American people of the rightness of their judgment. Instead, they stayed with what seemed the safe course, disregarding the appalling human cost of the war despite the fact that key people in the administration knew that the United States could not win and had little popular support in South Vietnam. Johnson, moreover, ardently believed in the concept ofpeace through strength that had informed almost every U.S. politician of his generation . Unlike more sophisticated students of international affairs, he endorsed and supported the prevailing ideology ofthe ColdWar, concluding that the United States had to stand against Communist expansion in Asia and elsewhere. Although Johnson had never wanted the war, when faced with the possibility of a hostile regime in Saigon, he remained unable to seize the opportunity presented to him by the Buddhists to escape from an increasingly unpopular war. Of course, many Vietnamese did not see it that way. They viewed the American attack on the NLF as part of a larger struggle against international Communism, the need to test new weapons, or part ofan American effort to colonize South Vietnam.1 Few outside of the GVN felt a sense of gratitude toward the United States, but many understood the heavy price being paid by their own people. Despite their enormous sacrifices, Buddhist leaders failed in their quest to motivate their fellow citizens outside ofcentral Vietnam to topple the GVN and end the war. The leadership stumbled when they lost touch with large segments of the UBC and the society they wanted to save. In the ideological split that fatally weakened the Vien Hoa Dao, many monks, nuns, and laypeople supported Thich Tam Chau; they saw the radicalism of monks like Thich Tri Quang as dangerous because it had brought the GVN down on all Buddhists. Thich Tri Quang and the radicals, on the other hand, saw the war as the greater hazard, since they believed that the American presence in South Vietnam would eventually lead to a 144 Conclusion Communist victory and the end of the UBC. The moderates, however, supported GVN and American efforts to confront the Communists on the battlefield. Thus, both factions viewed Communism as the greatest danger, but they disagreed on the best way to halt it. Other Buddhist groups and non-Buddhist organizations that had originally backed the Vien Hoa Dao drive for elections withdrew their support out of fear that the Buddhist leadership would seize control of the constituent assembly .2 Ky capitalized on these fears to gain enough support to crush the movement. For the...