Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency

12: Deploying U.S. Troops in a Counterinsurgent Role

180 RESISTING REBELLION 180 CHAPTER 12 DEPLOYING U.S.TROOPS IN A COUNTERINSURGENT ROLE A POLITICALLY CHARGED QUESTION If a single point of consensus emerged from the deeply divisive U.S. experience in Vietnam—rightly or wrongly—it seems to be this: the U.S. must be extremely selective in committing its troops to waging counterinsurgency in a foreign environment. When confronting the possibility of involvement in such a conflict, Washington policymakers will need to provide clear answers to questions such as the following: • What are the origin and nature of the insurgency in question? • What is the clear and direct U.S. interest in the conflict? • What evidence exists that U.S. intervention will effectively influence the conflict? • Why can’t the foreign country’s government handle the insurgents on its own? An effective government will almost certainly not be faced with a major insurgency. Hence if the U.S. intervenes on the ground against insurgents, sooner or later it will have to address the host country’s political situation— always a tricky and often an explosive business. This is not of course to repeat the fatuous insistence by some Americans on instant democracy in South Vietnam. But it is hard to imagine an American ground commitment achieving real—that is, lasting—success in a political rubbish dump. On the other hand, U.S. pressure on El Salvador substantially aided the cleaning up of the regime there. • Can the necessity for sustained U.S. intervention be persuasively presented to the American electorate and its representatives in Congress, in a post–Cold War environment? Under the Deploying U.S. Troops in a Counterinsurgent Role 181 very best of circumstances, most third world conflicts (at least) exhibit extreme moral ambiguities, which will provide sensational pictures for the media and disturb the U.S. electorate.1 If the reasons for the origin and continuation of the conflict are mainly cultural, then intervention will probably be frustrating and frustrated because cultures are slow to change, especially under foreign pressure, however benign. • Finally, what is the definition of success for the U.S. intervention under consideration? Clearly, such a list of questions would prove daunting to any but the most enthusiastic or convinced interventionist. Another persuasive argument against using U.S. combat troops in a faraway insurgency is this: To be effective, any counterinsurgency force needs to obtain useful intelligence, to be familiar with the terrain, and to give proof to the local civilians that the troops will not eventually abandon them. To accomplish all these ends would seem to require locally recruited soldiers , or at least troops designated for long-term service in the same place. These and other considerations help explain why in some key crises during the Cold War, the U.S. military vigorously and successfully opposed assuming a prominent counterinsurgent role. For example, during the height of the Communist-led Huk rebellion in the Philippines , some policymakers in Washington gave serious consideration to the Manila government’s repeated pleas for U.S. ground troops to be dispatched to that country. A memorandum, however, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in September 1950 pointed out the nonmilitary roots of the Philippine insurgency. “The basic problem [in the Philippines] is primarily political and economic. Military action should not be an alternative for [erecting] a stable and efficient government based on sound economic and social foundations.” The U.S. Armed Forces manifested similar opposition to committing U.S. ground troops during the Greek civil war.2 Assuredly, the wisdom of committing U.S. ground troops—or any foreign troops—to a counterinsurgency mission is a complex question. Not infrequently, foreign troops have defeated insurgents: British soldiers held Athens against a Communist uprising in 1945, and they did very well against the Communist insurgency in Malaya. Portuguese forces waged largely successful counterinsurgencies in their African 182 RESISTING REBELLION possessions in the 1960s and early 1970s. In contrast, it must be acknowledged that the U.S. committed many errors in South Vietnam (the first direct confrontation between U.S. troops and a Communist insurgency). Yet that does not mean that American troops should never be used against any insurgents anywhere. In fact Americans have achieved some impressive successes in counterinsurgency, notably by the army in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, and the Marines in Haiti and Nicaragua in the inter-war period.3 Moreover, the...