Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency

9: The Requirement of Rectitude

156 RESISTING REBELLION 156 CHAPTER 9 THE REQUIREMENT OF RECTITUDE A principal thesis of this book has been that true victory is one that leads to true peace, a peace founded on legitimacy and eventual reconciliation . Obtaining such an outcome requires that the counterinsurgent forces practice rectitude. THE FOUNDATION FOR LASTING VICTORY The noted theorist and practitioner of counterinsurgency Sir Robert Thompson defines rectitude as meaning that the forces of order are “acting in accordance with the law of the land, and in accordance with the highest civilized standards.”1 Along the same lines, the U.S. Marines distilled the following sage advice from their experience fighting guerrillas in Central America in the 1920s: “In small wars, tolerance, sympathy and kindliness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population.”2 Clearly, rectitude does not mean wearing kid gloves while fighting insurgents and their supporters. Right behavior does not preclude the rigorous punishment either of criminal elements among the insurgents, or of guerrillas who refuse to negotiate even though they are clearly losing, or of civilians who live in secure areas but persist in cooperating with guerrillas. Severity in such cases is acceptable, and often advisable —so long as it is discriminating. The harshness of Japanese and German counterinsurgency forces worked against their own aims mainly because of its indiscriminate nature: since the peaceful and law-abiding were punished along with, or instead of, the guilty, many found it safer to abandon normal activities and join the guerrillas. Counterinsurgent forces ought always to remember that they do not need the active support of the majority of the population. They need merely the support of some and the neutrality of most. A peasant population generally desires security, that is, the ability to live and work The Requirement of Rectitude 157 according to norms they see as just. If the forces of order behave as they should—specifically, providing the rural population with at least a minimal level of security—they will normally win the acquiescence of that key sector. This is even more true in those instances in which the guerrillas accept the aid or even membership of blatantly antisocial and criminal elements (a phenomenon that severely hurt the Philippine Huks, for but one example). Because they had provided decent administration during their occupation of Manchukuo—in stark contrast to the previous corrupt and arbitrary Chinese regimes—the Japanese won the gratitude of much of the population.3 In some cases, numerous civilians in a given area will be supportive of the military and police because they have relatives and friends in those organizations, especially if military units are stationed in areas from which they have been recruited. Both civilian fear of disorder and demonstrations of organizational efficacy by the military will reinforce this friendly predisposition. In these circumstances, right conduct by the military can solidify civilian support and marginalize guerrilla activity. Writing of Roman campaigns against irregular forces, Machiavelli observed : “Of all the methods that can be taken to gain the hearts of a people, none contribute so much as remarkable examples of continence and justice; such was the example of Scipio in Spain when he returned a most beautiful young lady safe and untouched to her father and her husband; this was a circumstance that was more conducive to the reduction of Spain than force of arms ever could have been. Caesar acquired such reputation for his justice in paying for the wood which he cut down to make palisades for his camps in Gaul that it greatly facilitated the conquest of that province.”4 Intelligence provided to Union forces in Virginia during the American Civil War improved notably after special guerrilla-hunting units learned to deal justly with civilians.5 Naturally, quite the contrary result derives from bad behavior by the counterinsurgent forces. Outraging sexual or religious mores and killing prisoners (whether civilian or guerrilla) will nearly always increase recruits for the guerrillas and hence increase casualties among government troops.6 But even lesser crimes such as “requisitioning” (that is, stealing) from the population only create tension and resentment . Therefore, the entrance of government forces into a district or village should not resemble the descent of a plague of locusts. 158 RESISTING REBELLION THE PRICE OF MISCONDUCT The strategist Basil Liddell Hart once observed that “the more brutal your methods, the more bitter you will make your opponents, with the natural result...