Notes
INTRODUCTION 1. Bragadin, Italian Navy, 363. CHAPTER 1. A NEW CHAPTER IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN 1. Roskill, War at Sea, vol. 3, pt. 1, app. G, 379–80. Secondary sources for the Mediterranean war from 1940–42 include D. Brown, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, vols. 1 and 2; Greene and Massignani, Naval War in the Mediterranean; de Belot, Struggle for the Mediterranean; Roskill, War at Sea, vols. 2 and 3; Playfair, Mediterranean and Middle East; and Mars, British Submarines at War. 2. Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey, 438–41, 61–63; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, 290–91; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 591. See also Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 1939–1945. Cunningham departed the Mediterranean on April 3, 1942, for London but did not arrive in Washington until late June. The “soft underbelly” strategy was in large part the brainchild of the chief of the Imperial General Staff, Alanbrooke, who strongly felt that it was the best way to keep German forces occupied and prevent them from being shifted to the west, to France. For critical comments on the “soft underbelly” strategy see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , 591. 3. Outlines of Allied grand strategy were laid down at the Arcadia Conference in Memorandum W.W. 1, see “Arcadia Conference: Proceedings of the American British Joint Chiefs of Staff Conferences 24 December 1941–14 January 1942,” U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Washington, D.C. (OA); Howard, Grand Strategy, vol. 4, app. I; M. Jones, Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 16–20; Morison, Naval Operations 2:12; Howe, Northwest Africa, chap. 1. 4. Morison, Naval Operations, 2:212. See also Butler, Grand Strategy, vol. 3, pt. 2; and Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–42. 5. Cunningham, Sailor’s Odyssey, 443, 447. The risk to British warships in the eastern Mediterranean from the Luftwaffe remained serious, as the sinking of the British cruiser Naiad several weeks later proved. 6. de Belot, Struggle for the Mediterranean, 10; Roskill, War at Sea, 2:57–62; Cunningham , Sailor’s Odyssey, 455; Barnett, Engage the Enemy, chap. 16. For more on the siege NOTES z-Tomblin notes.qx2 6/30/04 1:24 PM Page 491 of Malta and the USS Wasp’s aircraft ferry runs to Malta, see Cameron, Red Duster, White Ensign; Jellison, Besieged; Shores and Cull, with Malizia, Malta; and Woodman, Malta Convoys , 1940–1943. 7. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 591–92; Morison, Naval Operations, 2:15; Gelb, Desperate Venture, 96; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 355–57. According to Weinberg, the fall of Tobruk came as a profound shock to Churchill, and after that, the British, who earlier seemed to at least agree with the idea if not the exact location of a landing in northwest Europe in 1942, were even more cautious about it. On July 8, Churchill cabled FDR, “No British general, admiral, or air marshal is prepared to recommend Sledgehammer as a practicable operation in 1942.” 8. Morison, Naval Operations, 11:13–17; Gelb, Desperate Venture, 98–103; Howe, Northwest Africa, 13–15; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 604–11. See also Dreyer, “Decision to Invade North Africa.” Howe points out that FDR ignored the conditional nature of the decision and told Stimson and others he had unconditionally committed the United States to Torch. Howe argues that Roosevelt did not realize “that a campaign to seize North Africa would preclude an attack across the English Channel toward the heart of Germany in 1943.” 9. Morison, Naval Operations, 11:15; D’Este, World War II in the Mediterranean, 1; Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 32–33; Love, History of the U.S. Navy, 2:87–88. Love says Marshall chose Eisenhower on the recommendation of Adm. Ernie King. Love also says that King never liked Eisenhower’s command arrangements and faults King for not sending “enough navy planners to Eisenhower’s staff in London in August.” 10. Howe, Northwest Africa, 32–33; Morison, Naval Operations, 2:16–17; Butcher, Years with Eisenhower, 40; Howard, Grand Strategy, 4:112–17; J. Eisenhower, Allies, 121; D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 72–73; Clark, Calculated Risk, 39. The delay in Torch resulted because two of the divisions coming from the United States would not be ready until early November, and the Allies were unwilling to land only inside the Mediterranean lest the Germans attack Gibraltar via Spain. 11. Cunningham, Sailor’s Odyssey, 468–69; J. Eisenhower, Allies, 121; Morison, Naval Operations, 2:16. 12. Butcher...
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