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Allied victory in the Mediterranean theater in World War II was achieved not only by the courage, determination, and skill of Allied soldiers , sailors, and airmen but also by the cooperative efforts of British and American military forces. By working together to plan, develop, and implement amphibious warfare techniques, the Allies were able to carry out five successful, large-scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean theater from the fall of 1942 to the summer of 1944. Beginning with the Torch landings in Morocco, Algiers, and Oran, the Allies gradually gained control of the North African shore; invaded and conquered the islands of Sicily, Corsica, and Elba; put Allied divisions ashore at Salerno and Anzio; and eventually landed an entire army ashore in southern France in August 1944. Each of these operations in the Mediterranean provided Allied officers and enlisted men with valuable combat experience and offered senior Allied officers and planners important lessons in amphibious warfare that they tried, with varying success, to incorporate into each new operation plan. The Allies’ first major amphibious operation in the Mediterranean, Operation Torch, was hastily planned with less-than-adequate intelligence about Vichy French enemy intentions, defenses, and beach conditions . Coming early in the Allied war effort, with so few prior experiences of amphibious warfare to draw upon, the planning of Torch reflected numerous concerns, some of which proved valid, others groundless. For example, in their anxiety about mounting frontal assaults on heavily defended port cities and about the navy’s ability to supply ground forces over open beaches, Torch planners decided to include commando-type operations using old naval vessels to secure the airfield at Port Lyautey and the ports of Safi, Oran, and Algiers. The last two assaults proved disastrous , and planners abandoned the concept, except for a commando CONCLUSION y-Tomblin conclusion.qx2 6/30/04 1:23 PM Page 469 470 CONCLUSION effort to secure the small harbor of Anzio, for future Mediterranean operations in favor of supply over open beaches. American anxieties about Spanish neutrality and high surf along the Moroccan coast led planners to compromise on the location of the Torch landings, which in turn led them to forgo a landing east of Algiers and thereby prolonged the entire Tunisian campaign by months. Furthermore, concerns about preserving the element of surprise led planners to choose predawn assaults without the benefit of air or naval bombardments. Despite these concerns and others, including worry about U-boat attacks, the approach of Adm. Henry Hewitt’s Western Naval Task Force to French Morocco went fairly smoothly. Ultra intelligence allowed convoys to be routed around lurking enemy U-boats and, aided by the innovation of surface search radar, all three assault convoys found their transport areas, made course corrections to offset an unexpected northeasterly current, and, after some delays and confusion , began debarkation of troops. None of the approaches were found to be mined, nor were mines or obstacles discovered in the boat lanes, transport or fire support areas. This greatly simplified the debarkation, unloading, and fire support aspects of the Moroccan landings but tended to make planners of future Mediterranean amphibious operations discount the possibility of enemy-laid minefields and the difficulty of clearing mines and obstacles. Once the transports were in position, however, and debarkation had begun, the Americans’ lack of training and experience began to tell. Transports were overloaded or improperly loaded and the troops were inexperienced in debarkation, although the commander of transports, Capt. Robert E.M. Emmet, wrote that they were “relatively experienced , once they had gotten into the boats, at getting ashore.” Other reports, however, noted, “Men were so burdened by weapons, ammunition , and equipment as to be virtually immobilized,” causing several to drown getting out of their landing craft. Many other soldiers discarded their equipment on the beaches “so as to be able to march inland unencumbered.” Moreover, the Torch assault suffered from a poor boat employment plan, rising surf on the beaches that led to dozens of broached and stranded landing craft, and beach congestion. These shortcomings and others prompted Capt. Augustine H. Gray to recommend that “whenever practicable a tug be attached to each attack group.” The delays in unloading were attributed by other commanders to beach parties that were scattered with too few vehicles and trucks to unload supplies, to uncertain communications caused by the fragile quality of naval radios, and to a lack of bulldozers to make roads through the soft sand to allow supplies to flow inland.1 y...

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