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86 All the Kentuckians Wanted to Ride  7  THE LATE SUMMER AND EARLY FALL of 1862 was, perhaps, the only time that the Confederacy’s sun shined bright over Kentucky. For six weeks, Edmund Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg had the opportunity to solidify a strategy that could have resulted in serious consequences for the North. Bragg planned to unite with Kirby Smith and coordinate a joint invasion of middle Tennessee.The objective was to maneuver behind Buell’s army and cut him off from his Nashville supply base, thus forcing him to retreat north to Kentucky. If, according to this plan, Buell either was defeated in battle or retreated north to Kentucky, the Confederates would then have the option to push on into Kentucky. After the Chattanooga meeting, Bragg felt that there was complete understanding between himself and Kirby Smith concerning the execution of this plan. Particularly encouraged by Morgan’s and impressed by Duke’s glowing reports on the conditions in Kentucky, Kirby Smith believed that he could march his army as far as Lexington without encountering any significant opposition. On August 9, 1862, he wrote Bragg, explaining that an attempt to take the Cumberland Gap would involve a siege that was likely to take more time than the two generals had budgeted at their meeting. Alternatively, he argued: “A move direct to Lexington, Kentucky would effectively invest [Union general George] Morgan, and would be attended with most brilliant results in my judgment, I suggest my being allowed to take that course.”This decision , which was reluctantly agreed to by Bragg, effectively scotched the plan agreed on in Chattanooga.The question is why Bragg abandoned his original plan, which was militarily sound, without more resistance.The answer more likely than not lies in the Morgan and Duke dispatches.1 While Bragg and Kirby Smith prepared their plans, Morgan’s brigade took a well-deserved rest at Hartsville. On August 24, 1862, Duke was ordered to turn over General Johnson and two other officers captured during the engagement on the Hartsville Road for transfer to Knoxville. This is the only significant military event, albeit administrative, that involved Duke during the last week of August. All the Kentuckians Wanted to Ride 87 Duke, like his soldiers, was eagerly anticipating a move north into Kentucky and home. He had still not seen his son and was obviously missing Tommie. On August 28, Morgan received orders to move north into the Bluegrass for a rendezvous with Kirby Smith and his army in Lexington on or about September 2, 1862. Kirby Smith had started his army north from Knoxville two weeks earlier. The general had not anticipated the bad roads that he encountered in eastern Kentucky, and his progress was significantly slowed. His army seemed to inch its way through the mountains and passes of that region. He wrote Bragg: “The country around here having been almost completely drained of all kinds of supplies, and the roads between here and eastTennessee being much worse than I had supposed,I find I have but two courses left to me.” He could either return to Knoxville for supplies or continue on to Lexington. He advised Bragg that he had chosen the latter alternative . The invasion of Kentucky was now on in earnest.2 By August 26, 1862, Kirby Smith’s army had gained momentum and was moving toward Richmond, Kentucky. Just as Morgan and Duke had predicted, except for the occasional bushwhacker, they had not met any serious resistance. This changed dramatically when the Confederate cavalry commanded by Colonel John Scott suddenly clashed with six hundred federal troops commanded by Colonel Leonidas Metcalfe approximately eighteen miles south of Richmond at Big Hill. Scott, who commanded a tough veteran force of approximately 650 cavalrymen, after a sharp fight that lasted about an hour and a half forced Metcalfe to retreat in disorder. Metcalf reported ten men killed and another ninety captured with no accounting for his wounded, Scott four men killed and twelve wounded. The engagement confirmed what many Unionists feared: that a major Confederate force was moving into Kentucky and that the federal presence was unprepared. With the news of the Confederate victory at Big Hill, frantic attempts were made by the home guard in Lexington to organize and prepare a credible defense. In a sense, this reaction was comic, considering the significance of the Confederate invasion, but, without considerable reinforcements, there was not much else that could be done.3 With Robert E. Lee...

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