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Late in 2001, the Council on Foreign Relations invited twenty-five academics, corporate executives, oil industry consultants, retired military men, and American diplomats to meet at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy on the oak-shaded campus of Rice University. Cochaired by two former career foreign service officers, Edward P. Djerejian and Frank G. Wisner, the group was charged with mapping out a plan for the United States’ role in Iraq after the anticipated war. The final report that followed, Guiding Principles for U.S. PostConflict Policy in Iraq, outlines a three-phase, at least two-year process by which Iraq would be “liberated,” cleansed of Baathists and weapons of mass destruction , and transformed into a democratic, free-market republic fully integrated into the community of nations. The authors of the report never challenge the wisdom of war on Iraq; rather, their plan is built within the framework of what is presumably a “best-case scenario”: a short and swift war with low casualties and relatively little urban warfare. The authors also concede that full compliance by the Iraqi state with relevant UN resolutions or a coup might eliminate the need for an invasion. Although the Council on Foreign Relations is adamant in its assertion that it has no affiliation with the U.S. government, the Baker Institute’s close association with the current administration suggests that the report will contribute to the shape of any postwar American occupation of Iraq. This is especially the case with the involvement of Djerejian, who served for much of the 1980s as ambassador in Damascus and Tel Aviv and has often been used to open backchannel contacts in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Djerejian is a careful and sanguine thinker who is deeply sensitive to the history and culture of the region; he understands intimately the explosive power of sectarian and ethnic conflict and how corrosive the asymmetries of American policies toward Israel have been. The report bears his unmistakable imprint in the way it envisions “quiet U.S.–Iranian cooperation,” notes that the elimination of Saddam Hussein will not cure all the ills of Iraqi society, and concludes that the United States “must avoid imposing Versailles-style conditions on Iraq” (13). By the same token, the report’s emphasis on the stabilization of Iraq’s oil industry—partially for the redevelopment of the country—and on the use of The Guiding Principles and the U.S.“Mandate” for Iraq Twentieth-Century Colonialism and America’s New Empire Keith D. Watenpaugh 269 American power to level “the playing field for awarding energy sector contracts by supporting a transparent and competitive process” (10) reflects the contribution of, among others, cochair Frank Wisner. Wisner has had various jobs in the State and Defense departments since the Vietnam era and most recently served as ambassador to New Delhi. He was appointed to the board of directors of the now bankrupt Enron in 1997 and currently works as vice-chairman of external affairs for American International Group, one of the world’s largest insurance and financial services companies. His involvement is a tacit acknowledgment that postwar Iraq policy is predicated less on disarmament or democratization and more on the interests of the American energy sector. The report envisions a “superintending role” for the United States over a UN-supervised Iraqi administration: One that maintains low visibility but is clearly committed to protecting law and order and creating a breathing space for a nascent Iraqi government to take shape. The U.S. role will be best played in the background guiding progress and making sure that any peacekeeping force is effective and robust enough to do its job. . . . While moving the process along as quickly as possible, the United States must not be limited by self-imposed timelines, but should rather adopt an objectives-based approach. (6) The “behind-the-scenes” strategy of America’s efforts—which would be led by an “Iraqi coordinator”—is calculated to preclude any appearance of colonialism . The anxiety over U.S. actions being interpreted as neoimperialist courses through the document. For example: “A heavy American hand will only convince them, and the rest of the world that the operation against Iraq was undertaken for imperialist, rather than disarmament. It is in America’s interest to discourage such misperceptions” (10–11). To counteract any “misperceptions ” that might arise, the report’s authors advocate the use of “vigorous public diplomacy,” not just in the Arab and Muslim worlds but also...

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