Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces

1. World War I: The Birth of American Armor

1 World War I The Birth of American Armor Dale E. Wilson One of history's great ironies is that the nation that spawned the technology from which the tank was created did not play a role in that vehicle's conception. It is equally ironic that the United States, which later became known as the "arsenal of democracy," was unable to produce a single armored vehicle that saw combat with its Tank Corps. Although the Army trained more than twenty thousand tank officers and crewmen in less than a year, and shipped more than half of them to France, it was able to send only three battalions into combat—in vehicles borrowed from its European allies.1 Finally, in what can only be called one of history's most prescient acts, the U.S. Army chose George S. Patton Jr.—whose name would become synonymous with armored warfare a generation later—to be the first Soldier in its ranks assigned to duty with tanks. That is the rough framework for the story of the World War I Tank Corps. It is a fascinating tale, fraught with important lessons for combat leaders charged with preparing men to employ new weapons in battle and materiel managers who must work to get those weapons into Soldiers ' hands. Sadly, historians have largely ignored it.2 What follows is a brief look at how the U.S. Army first incorporated the tank into its force structure, developed doctrine for its employment, and trained and fielded a small but competent tank force on the battlefields of France during World War I. 2 Dale E. Wilson In June 1917, Gen. John J. Pershing, commander of the recently arrived American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), read a report on British and French tank operations submitted to the director of the Army War College by the American military mission in Paris. Pershing, greatly impressed by the report, which included the personal observations of Maj. Frank Parker, a liaison officer who observed French tank operations in the April offensive, immediately appointed several committees to study tank warfare. He also instructed several members of his staff to visit the front lines and look at British and French tank organization and tactics. Despite misgivings expressed by some of these observers, Pershing concluded that a mix of British heavy tanks and French light tanks would be a valuable asset when the AEF went into battle.3 At the time, the Allies had only five tanks in production: the British Mark IV and V heavy tanks, and the French Schneider, St.-Chamond, and Renault vehicles. However, neither the Schneider nor the St.Chamond could truly be classified as a tank. They were actually lightly armored tracked artillery carriers that had to be accompanied by infantry skirmishers who carefully marked the routes the vehicles should follow. All of the American observers agreed that the Schneider and St.Chamond were unsuited for tank operations. Colonel Frank Parker (center) and Louis Renault (left) inspect a Renault Char FT light tank at the Renault tank production facility at Billancourt in August 1917. Renault Communications. World War I 3 Inspired by the observers' reports—and the inability of members of a joint British-French tank board to reconcile differences in the Allies' theories on tactics and equipment—Pershing directed that a board of officers be convened to perform a detailed study of British heavy tanks and the French Renault Char FT (faible [light] tonnage) light tank. The members of the board (Cols. Fox Conner and Frank Parker, Lt. Col. Clarence C. Williams, and Maj. Nelson E. Margetts) submitted a report of their findings on 1 September. They concluded that the tank would play an important role in the war and that Pershing should create a separate Tank Department with a single chief reporting directly to him. They further recommended that a force of more than two thousand tanks be procured by the AEF, with a 10-to-l mix of light to heavy tanks, and that production be geared to provide for a 15 percent monthly replacement rate.4 Pershing responded by assigning Lt. Col. LeRoy Eltinge, an operations staff officer, the job of drafting specific requirements for a "Combat Tank Service" for the AEF. Working closely with other members of the AEF staff, Eltinge determined that a force of six hundred heavy and twelve hundred light tanks, more than eight hundred trucks and automobiles, 180 motorcycles, and...