Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces

10. Adaptation and Impact: Mounted Combat in Vietnam

10 Adaptation and Impact Mounted Combat in Vietnam Lewis Sorley The definition of what constitutes armor has from at least the close of World War II been complicated by the fact that there is a branch called "Armor" composed of some, but only some, of those elements that in the recent war had made up the armored force. Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee Jr. described that force as "a balanced team of combat arms and services of equal importance and equal prestige." Tanks, armored infantry mounted in half-tracks, armored field artillery, tank destroyer elements, and the whole range of what are now known as combat support and combat service support components were thus assigned or attached to the World War II-era armored divisions and armored cavalry groups. The evolution of the armament and equipment of various elements of the armored force over the past half century, and of the doctrine for its employment—especially in terms of mechanized infantry and helicopters —has further expanded the envelope of what might be considered the armored force, while at the same time taking it perhaps even a little farther beyond what falls unequivocally within the narrower purview of the branch designated Armor. For the purposes of this essay an inclusionary approach has been Adaptation and Impact 325 chosen. Consideration will thus be given to a wide range of units and their equipment and operations, to include tank and armored cavalry, air cavalry, mechanized infantry, and a number of specialized systems. It goes without saying that, as proof of the enduring validity of General Chaffee's observation, all the participants in armored operations in Vietnam were critically dependent on every type of support, from logistics and medical services through quartermaster, transportation, maintenance , and more, all "of equal importance and equal prestige." The Armored Force monument near Arlington Cemetery in Washington provides further perspective on the categorization of units, memorializing the Vietnam service of a U.S. Army armored cavalry regiment, three tank battalions and a separate tank company, six armored cavalry squadrons, ten mechanized infantry battalions, twentytwo armored artillery battalions, and four armored cavalry troops, along with two Marine Corps tank battalions, two amphibian tractor battalions , and an armored amphibian company.1 The armored cavalry regiment and the divisional armored cavalry squadrons also had organic air cavalry elements, while ground armor and cavalry elements habitually operated with aviation elements under their operational control or in support. Initially it appeared that armor would have little part in the fighting in Vietnam. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of American forces there from June 1964 until the summer of 1968, was skeptical of armor's usefulness and ability to operate in the combat environment as he assessed it. An artilleryman himself, Westmoreland's service had been entirely in infantry and airborne units. Nor had he any theoretical knowledge of armor, for the Army's famous school system had almost entirely passed him by. So limited was Westmoreland's military education , in fact, that according to his biographer "the only service school he ever undertook in his Army career" was "the cooks and bakers school at Schofield" Barracks, Hawaii.2 General Westmoreland's duties in Vietnam included being senior adviser to the South Vietnamese military forces. Indeed, the designation of his headquarters—U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)—emphasized that role. Had Westmoreland been more observant in terms of the armored elements in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) he was charged with advising, he would have seen that they were able to function effectively in many parts of the country, terrain and weather notwithstanding. But, lacking practical experience, theoretical knowledge, or observation of his ally, Westmoreland concluded that armored operations were not feasible in Vietnam. In a July 1965 message to Army Chief of Staff 326 Lewis Sorley Gen. Harold K. Johnson—at a time when the Army's massive buildup of ground forces in Vietnam was just getting underway—Westmoreland asserted that "except for a few coastal areas, most notably in the I Corps area, Vietnam is no place for either tank or mechanized infantry units."3 That outlook was probably reinforced by the preponderance of airborne infantry officers with whom Westmoreland populated his MACV staff. It was also reflected at Department of the Army, where General Johnson, an infantryman by background and experience, shared Westmoreland's views on the unsuitability of armor for the Vietnam battlefield. The 1st...