Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces

7. Post-World War II and Korea: Paying for Unpreparedness

7 Post-World War II and Korea: Paying for Unpreparedness Philip L. Bolte When World War II ended with Japan's surrender on 2 September 1945 there were only two superpowers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union. America's leaders soon concluded they must contain what they perceived as a remorseless expansionist tendency in the policies of the Soviet Union.1 Meanwhile, in keeping with the traditional American view that armed forces are used to destroy occasional and intermittent threats, the American public clamored for demobilization.2 Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal summed up what was happening when he observed that the country "was going back to bed at a frightening rate, which is the best way I know to be sure of the coming of World War III."3 In spite of such concern among the nation's leaders, the public was going to get what it wanted. President Harry S. Truman proposed on 25 September 1945 to reduce the Army from 8 million to 1.95 million by the following June. Then, in March 1946, the War Department announced a proposed Army of 1.07 million by June 1947, with four hundred thousand of those to be transferred to the planned independent air force. To further support such drastic reductions, the United States adopted a strategy of deterrence based on the atomic bomb monopoly the country then enjoyed.4 By 1948 the mounting tension between the Soviet Union and the United States was evident in such far-flung places as Greece, Iran, China, and Korea. Unfortunately, America's armed forces had reached a dan- 218 Philip L Bolte gerous state of readiness. As Gen. George Marshall put it, "We are playing with fire and have nothing with which to put it out." Army strength had sunk to 552,000, with most of the troops deployed on occupation duty. The Army's contribution to the strategic reserve was a little over two divisions—a forty-thousand-man force that included only one armored combat command.5 The Armored Force component in Europe was the U.S. Constabulary, consisting of three brigades. The basic building blocks for these units were squadrons composed of a light tank troop, a motorcycle platoon, and a horse platoon. The four infantry divisions on occupation duty in Japan each had only one company of light tanks.6 It was the postwar low point of the active Army's Armored Force. With the growing truculence of the Soviet Union and the 1947 establishment of the Truman Doctrine (the president's determination that America should help free peoples everywhere respond to communist aggression) American policy had reached a turning point.7 One result was a modest increase in the strength of the armed forces. For the Armored Force, this meant strengthening the 2d Armored Division and activating the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in the United States, and converting the Constabulary brigades into three armored cavalry regiments in Europe.8 Meanwhile, the Army had been gleaning lessons from its World War II operations, in spite of postwar troop strength reductions and the emergence of the national strategy of nuclear deterrence. The result of this effort was reflected in both organizational changes and in the direction taken in weapons system development. One of the earliest and most significant steps in this effort was made by the General Board that convened in Europe immediately after the war. One of the board's reports, "Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment of the Armored Division," was important to the future shape of the Armored Force. The study confirmed the value of armored divisions and the tactics for employment developed during the war.9 It also included a number of specific recommendations concerning organization and equipment. Some of these were ultimately adopted, while others were modified for later implementation. Concerning organization, the General Board recommended that armored division strength be increased to that of the wartime heavy division. It favored a regimental structure that combined tank and infantry battalions, although the board members were unable to agree on the exact ratio to be established. The board recommended increasing divisional cavalry strength to a squadron, as well as increasing the strength of artillery and engineer units within the division. It also rec- Post-World War II and Korea 219 ommended that elements normally attached during operations be made organic to the division. Additional aircraft for liaison and command...