In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

PART 2 > IN THE ARENA Part 2 of this book is a "reality check," a no-holds-barred examination of the external limitations and constraints that may be placed on U.S. space activities described in part 1. In defense language, this portion of the book addresses the broad and sometimes ambiguous subject of space threats. Objectivity in this analysis is crucial, and I have made every effort to deal evenhandedly with the facts, all of which have surfaced in the public domain. Although the conclusions offered in this part will suffer somewhat in the details from not having had a window into the classified world of the national intelligence estimates, available public information is good enough to help us arrive at useful findings with respect to the national space vision and defense policy. The new international security environment demands that policy makers and defense planners come to grips with a basic question: What is a space threat? United States' leaders will engage the public on security and space subjects through an understanding of the threat. Yet there are several reasons why getting our arms around this subject might not seem as easy as it looks, four of which the reader should consider. The space threat is complex. In trying to understand present and future dangers involving the space environment, it is important to recognize that a foe of the United States could use space in two very different ways. An enemy could exploit, first, vulnerabilities in U.S. satellite systems. There are proliferating high- and lowtechnology antisatellite capabilities, from information warfare to direct-ascent ASAT weapons to nuclear-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP). We can thus, according to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "expect some adversaries in 2010 to have the ability to attack low-earth-orbiting satellites."1 110 In the Arena Second, a foe could use space to further its strategic and military objectives by exploiting information derived from satellites. The number of dedicated military satellites is growing. Commercial satellite services and markets are expanding. Some satellite services (such as the signals from the global positioning system satellites, some communications satellites, and the Internet) are universally available and relatively inexpensive or even free. Today's space threats are immature and sparse. The profile of threats to U.S. space systems and threats from foreign space systems is relatively low—so low, in fact, that there is no consensus regarding the gravity of current and projected dangers. As a result, little attention has been paid to implications of hostilities involving space operations in times of peace and war. Concepts for space warfare also are in the early phases of development in the United States and abroad. The conclusions presented in part 2 will underscore that as more satellites are placed in orbit, as more military missions move into space, and as the United States and its allies grow increasingly dependent on satellites to perform functions vital to national existence and the creation of wealth, the frequency and intensity of specific space threats will change over time. For these reasons, it may be argued that now is a time when heightened awareness, rather than complacency, is called for. The space threat is evasive. Space threats lack a strong definition in the minds of policy makers. Aside from the explosion of nuclear weapons in space, there are no "scary" weapons to command the attention of U.S. leaders. Multi-use and commercially available technologies make most space activities possible. There are, however, no Scud-like weapons to provide a dramatic visual effect or to drive home the true menace behind threats to the United States' ability to exploit space or the enemy's ability to use space against the United States. Moreover, many countries have access to space technologies, meaning that there is no firm basis for defining a "rogue nation." Space threats are viewed generally to he nonlethal. Satellites are generally seen as conduits for information, not vessels for people. The odd exception is the use of the space shuttle and, possibly one day, the International Space Station. Since modern -day satellite operations deliver information, not firepower, the fact that satellites contribute significantly to terrestrial warfare may be lost on most people. Unless one is careful to draw this linkage, one may come to the erroneous conclusion that the loss of satellites will not result in the loss of blood, land, or treasure. The chapters that follow will explore the most significant aspects of this subject matter. Chapter...

Share