So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos

Introduction

introduction We’ve Got So Much to Lose if That Thing Goes Sour President John F. Kennedy began the telephone call with an ironic jab: “am i talking to the architect of the Geneva accords?”1 W. averell harriman, under secretary of state for political affairs and the chief uS negotiator at Geneva, replied with good humor that the characterization was accurate. as both men knew well, harriman had single-mindedly pursued a negotiated settlement of the civil war in Laos. The result was an international agreement that achieved Kennedy’s goal of preventing a communist victory without committing american combat troops. There had, however, been skepticism in and out of the uS government about the willingness of the communist signatories to comply with the agreement, which recognized a neutral coalition government and prohibited the use of Lao territory to interfere in the affairs of neighboring countries. if the accords went “down,” said harriman, he would “take the blame.” The president, who appreciated harriman’s efforts on his behalf, admitted: “i have a piece of it.”2 The date of the phone call was april 21, 1963. Laos, an impoverished, landlocked Southeast asian country that was geopolitically significant only because it bordered more powerful communist and anticommunist nations, was one of Kennedy’s earliest and most persistent foreign-policy problems. For the third successive spring the country was flaring up into an international crisis. The accords, signed in Geneva the previous July, 2 So Much to Lose had removed Laos as a point of direct conflict between the united States and the Soviet union, yet leaders of the kingdom’s competing political factions thought the agreement bore “no relation to political realities within Laos.”3 renewed fighting broke out on the Plaine des Jarres, the strategic plateau named by the French for its clusters of ancient stone jars. The parts of Laos controlled by the communist-led Pathet Lao, including the infiltration routes from the democratic republic of (north) Vietnam (drV) into the republic of (South) Vietnam (rVn), remained closed to conservative and neutral officials. and Kennedy and his advisers were once again considering military measures to convince the Pathet Lao, the drV, the People’s republic of china (Prc), and, above all, the Soviet union that the united States would not permit a communist takeover in Laos. in his phone call with Kennedy, harriman declared that now was “the moment to talk” with Soviet premier nikita S. Khrushchev: “We have every right to demand that he live up to his agreement.”4 harriman’s comment referred to two understandings between the united States and the Soviet union. The first was achieved at an otherwise rancorous 1961 summit meeting in Vienna, where Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed that Laos had no strategic significance for either of their countries and that the two superpowers should work for a neutral settlement there. harriman subsequently reached a second, more specific agreement with Georgi M. Pushkin, Soviet deputy foreign minister for Southeast asian affairs and his counterpart at Geneva: the Soviet union would “police the commitments made by the communist signatories not to interfere in the internal affairs of Laos nor to use Laos as a corridor into South Viet-nam.” harriman considered this Soviet obligation the “single most important” outcome of the Geneva conference.5 With Kennedy’s authorization, harriman traveled to Moscow in april 1963, but his démarche to Khrushchev was unsuccessful. in his report to the president, harriman observed that Khrushchev “is fed up with the subject [Laos] and wishes it would go away.” Whether the Soviet premier had the ability or will to influence the Pathet Lao was a question that remained “unanswered.” it was harriman’s “impression” that Khrushchev “probably would like to live up to his Vienna agreement.” The Soviet premier, however, was having “difficulty” honoring that commitment because of the more militant views of the Prc and drV.6 Kennedy, unhappy with the failure of the Geneva agreement and with introduction 3 unfulfilled Soviet promises to ensure the compliance of communist signatories , reluctantly explored overt military options to prevent a Pathet Lao victory and to end drV support for the insurgents. even before harriman ’s meeting with Khrushchev, Kennedy requested a Pentagon study of feasible “military action we could take against hanoi” that would demonstrate uS determination in Laos. The Joint chiefs of Staff (JcS) returned with proposals for air attacks against ports, bridges, airfields...