So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos

Appendix 3

appendix 3 MeMoranduM For the PreSident Note: This appendix is the complete declassified version of the sanitized memorandum that appears in FRUS, 1961–1963, XXIV, d. 477. The redacted portions of the FRUS document appear in bracketed, italicized type. The root of the problem in Southeast asia is the aggressive effort of the north Vietnamese to establish communist control in Laos and South Viet-nam as a stepping-stone to control all Southeast asia. in response to this effort, we have pursued courses of action corresponding to the differing circumstances in Laos, South Viet-nam and Thailand. uS prestige is engaged in both Laos and South Viet-nam. if we are to preserve the prospects for success in South Viet-nam and keep our commitment to defend Thailand within manageable bounds, we must pursue our intention of preventing further expansion of communist control in Laos. our efforts over the past year to obtain north Vietnamese withdrawal from Laos by international agreement have gained for us a great deal of political capital internationally. They should, therefore, not be abandoned lightly or before we have exhausted their possibilities completely. Since, however, the communist effort is ambiguous, we require a program for graduated increases in uS political and military pressure which, without setting into motion an irreversible pattern, will enable us to achieve, if not a truly neutral Laos under an effective Government of national union, at least the facade of a neutralist government presiding over a stabilized de facto partition. 268 appendix 3 This memorandum outlines a program of action which the Secretaries of State and defense recommend—not as a contingency response to communist tactics—but as a method of influencing the over-all situation so that events will move in the direction of the stabilization we desire. it is fully recognized that if the communists fail to respond to lesser pressures , the third phase of this program is such as to constitute the initiation of military action against north Vietnam which would logically call for a radically changed objective. The actions involved are included to demonstrate the sequential relationship of potential pressures in the event future circumstances dictate such a solution. at this time, we recommend approval of this over-all concept in principle , and approval of Phase i and those Phase ii actions not violating north Vietnamese sovereignty. When the effect of the initial actions can be evaluated, recommendations will be submitted with respect to necessity and timing of subsequent actions. The Situation in Laos our continuing basic objective is to force a cessation of communist encroachment in Southeast asia in order to allow a peaceful development of the area. in Laos, Pathet Lao-Viet Minh forces, in violation of the Geneva accords, are eliminating neutralist Kong Le positions piecemeal through military attacks and political pressures. The continuation of this communist tactic, particularly in the Plain of Jars, will symbolize to Laotians, their Southeast asian neighbors, and the communists alike that force can be used to erode Free World positions without the risk of serious consequences. Moreover, so long as neither Moscow nor Peiping sees such consequences as imminent, their dispute over communist strategy will encourage each to compete with the other in supporting Pathet Lao attacks. to halt this process, we have considered ways of making the risk of serious consequences from further communist incursions both credible and serious, especially for hanoi on whom rests primary responsibility for communist aggression in Laos and South Viet-nam. We doubt that communist plans in Laos include so gross and overt an act of aggression as to provide us with an obvious provocation which in itself would give reason for our intervention. rather, their erosive tactics, successful in the past, will be employed in hope of steadily improving communist posi- Memorandum for the President 269 tions without arousing Free World counteraction. however, we believe the situation sufficiently serious to require our seizing the initiative at a time of our choosing. Therefore our proposed moves are not linked to a future contingency but to the present and prospective situation. By so acting , we can halt north Vietnamese expansionist aggression in Laos and reduce its threat to peace in Southeast asia. We propose to achieve a stabilization of the situation either along the pattern of re-establishing the Government of national union under the Geneva agreements or through an informal but stabilized partition behind the facade of a neutralist government (i...