So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos

8. We Do Not Have the Power of Decision

chapter 8 We do not have the Power of decision Wearing an elegant, lightly colored suit, Prince Souvanna Phouma carried a homburg, a pair of gray gloves, and a gold-tipped umbrella when he stepped out of a uSaF plane at Washington national airport on Thursday , July 26, 1962. dean rusk shook his hand and welcomed him to the united States at a brief ceremony at the airport’s Military air transportation Service terminal. Souvanna, who understood english but spoke it reluctantly, addressed an audience of uS officials, foreign diplomats, and reporters in flawless, unaccented French: “i am looking forward to discussing with President Kennedy the question of american help for my country.”1 at a meeting at the State department the next day, rusk and Souvanna resumed the talks they had started in Geneva. after reviewing various ways of providing foreign aid to Laos, rusk raised a topic that he characterized as “sensitive”: the Geneva requirement to withdraw all foreign troops from the kingdom. he noted that the “relatively few” uS military advisers were easily identified. But there were several thousand north Vietnamese soldiers, and they appeared “similar to the Lao people.” how would it be possible, rusk asked, to assure “the world that foreign military personnel did in fact leave Laos?”2 Souvanna reminded rusk that they had already discussed this question in Geneva. The prime minister reiterated that his own concerns about the intentions of the north Vietnamese had prompted his June visit to hanoi. Prime Minister Pham Van dong had said that all drV troops would leave Laos by the Geneva deadline and that he would do “nothing to create difficulties for Souvanna within or outside of Laos.” Souvanna tried to dispel rusk’s doubts by observing that any north Vietnamese 152 So Much to Lose troops who remained in Laos would need food and supplies from villages in the countryside. Westerners might not be able to distinguish the Vietnamese from the various peoples of Laos, Souvanna said, but the villagers could easily recognize their traditional enemy: “Therefore, he was not worried.”3 Souvanna may not have been concerned about drV compliance with the Geneva agreement, but uS officials were. according to the minutes of a meeting at the Pentagon, Mcnamara talked to Souvanna about the accords’ prohibition against using Lao territory to interfere in the affairs of other countries. “our particular concern,” said Mcnamara, “was that infiltration from north Vietnam into South Vietnam cease.” Souvanna replied that he planned to follow closely the work of the icc. Without explaining how he would prevent infiltration through Laos, Souvanna said that “he would be responsible for the rLG’s fulfillment of its obligations.”4 at a meeting with dci Mccone and harriman, Souvanna continued his efforts to allay his hosts’ fears about drV troops in Laos. once again referring to his visit to hanoi, Souvanna agreed that the north Vietnamese should leave the kingdom but dismissed their continued presence as “no great problem.” he added: “all Lao villagers hated the north Vietnamese. They would keep him informed if the north Vietnamese remained.” an unnamed agency note taker observed that Souvanna “did not explain how [the villagers] would communicate with him, and what he would do if north Vietnamese promises were broken.”5 Mccone and his agency colleagues found Souvanna’s vague comments about the north Vietnamese in Laos “unsatisfactory.” More acceptable to cia officials was the discussion of the hmong. Souvanna, who was not informed of uS plans to maintain the hmong guerrilla army “intact with arms hidden” after Geneva, told Mccone and harriman that the united States could continue to air drop rice and nonmilitary supplies to the tribal people. Souvanna naively observed that the establishment of inspection teams, composed of representatives of each Lao political faction, would both prevent the delivery of arms to the hmong and forestall nLhS complaints about uS relief flights. he also gratefully accepted Mccone’s offer to support the neutralist party’s newspaper and to receive regular intelligence briefings. according to notes of the conversation, agency officials believed they had “diminished Souvanna’s distrust of the cia and contributed to his confidence in the intentions of the u.S. Government.”6 We do not have the Power of decision 153 Souvanna met with President Kennedy in the oval office at 11:30 a.m. on July 27. Kennedy, sitting in his cushioned rocking chair, said that he was...