So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos

7. A Colossal Booby Trap

chapter 7 a colossal Booby trap Phoumi nosavan, chastened by uS economic, diplomatic, and military pressure, flew to the Plaine des Jarres on Thursday, June 7, 1962, to negotiate with Souvanna and Souphanouvong about the formation of a coalition government. not entirely confident about his personal security in hostile territory, he startled the neutralist and Pathet Lao leaders by arriving with more than forty western correspondents in tow.1 Phoumi had assured ambassador Brown that he would cooperate fully in reaching a political settlement. “it remains to be seen, of course,” Brown cabled the State department, “whether the performance will match the promise.” if the Plaine des Jarres talks broke down because of “Phoumi’s intransigence ,” Brown, ambassador addis, and French ambassador Pierre-Louis Falaize agreed on the need “to force [the] immediate resignation and/or reorganization of [the] present government coupled with efforts to keep Souvanna in [the] picture.”2 Phoumi entered the talks with only two demands: (1) all major decisions on domestic and defense matters would require the unanimous approval of the three leaders; and (2) their respective military forces would remain in place until the new government reached an agreement on integrating them into a national army. Souvanna accepted both of Phoumi’s basic conditions, and Souphanouvong agreed that each army should remain in place pending a more specific understanding on merging the three forces. The unanimity principle on all major decisions, however, would require more thought, said Souphanouvong. he would provide a reply the next day, presumably after conferring with his Pathet Lao superiors. The horse-trading by the Lao leaders over the distribution of cabinet posts was businesslike, with the proportion of portfolios reserved for left- and right-leaning neutralists the principal area of disagreement. addis characterized the atmosphere of 132 So Much to Lose the talks as “very good,” and Brown considered the day’s developments “encouraging.”3 The negotiations resumed at 9:00 a.m. on June 8. Souphanouvong now concurred with Phoumi and Souvanna that major defense and domestic issues should be decided unanimously. The three leaders further agreed that the same principle should apply to foreign relations. There were, however, disagreements over the acceptability of certain individuals for cabinet positions. Souphanouvong, for example, objected to ngon Sananikone serving as a neutralist minister. The younger brother of former prime minister Phoui Sananikone, ngon was an anticommunist official whom the State department described as “a valuable source of information” and “responsive to u.S. suggestions.”4 Phoumi thought that Souvanna’s nomination of neutralist general amkha Soukhavong, locked up in a Far “reeducation center” since october 1960, was “provocative and improper.” according to the draft Geneva accords, prisoner-of-war issues would be a responsibility of the new government. Brown’s “main concern” about the potential appointment was what amkha “might try to do to [the] Far after being imprisoned by it for so long.”5 The sharpest disagreement over a cabinet member was prompted by Souvanna’s selection of Quinim Pholsena as foreign minister. a representative of the neutralist delegation at Geneva, Quinim was a Laotian of chinese descent who had struggled for acceptance by the kingdom’s classconscious elites. a protégé of Souvanna’s family—he reportedly lodged in the servants’ quarters—Quinim had been a civil servant, an elected official , and, at least since 1955, a Pathet Lao sympathizer. Phoumi and his associates believed that “Quinim actually takes orders from the nLhS.” uS officials shared similar suspicions. according to the State department, Quinim was “a threat to the u.S. if in any significant cabinet post.”6 at the Plaine des Jarres meeting, Phoumi declared that Quinim was “unacceptable” as the minister of foreign affairs and proposed right-leaning neutralists as alternatives. Souvanna replied that Phoumi’s stance was “impossible” and threatened to “throw in his hand and quit” if the Lao general did not reconsider his position. Phoumi retreated, explaining that he was simply requesting consideration of his idea. he then proposed, and the two princes accepted, a suggestion to adjourn the talks for a weekend of “reflection.”7 after the meeting, ambassador Falaize, the foreign diplomat clos- a colossal Booby trap 133 est to Souvanna, told Brown that the neutralist leader seemed “tired.” Souvanna had complained to Falaize about the negotiating behavior of Souphanouvong and Phoumi: “if one side didn’t raise difficulties then the other did.” to Souvanna’s frustration, both men claimed...