So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos

6. A Very Hazardous Course

chapter 6 a Very hazardous course after weeks of intensifying skirmishing, the battle of nam Tha began in earnest at 3:00 a.m., May 6, 1962, when antigovernment artillery began bombarding the Far command post and a 105-mm howitzer battery on the outskirts of town. Pathet Lao and PaVn infantry, estimated at four or more battalions, attacked the town from three directions. The main force approached from the northwest on the trail from Muong Sing, a small town five miles from the border with china. Machine-gun fire from antigovernment troops in the high ground above nam Tha covered the valley. initially, the defending Far units did a “creditable job in [the] face [of a] well-coordinated attack,” according to the senior MaaG adviser at the garrison. The outnumbered First BP delayed the enemy advance from Muong Sing, and Far artillery continued to fire despite accurate counterbattery shelling from 75- and 85-mm enemy guns.1 With the attackers clearly intent on seizing nam Tha, Major General Bounleut Sanichanh, the ranking Far officer and a devoted Phoumi loyalist, left the garrison by helicopter at 7:00 a.m. other Far officers soon followed Bounleut’s example, fleeing by jeeps, trucks, or any other form of transportation at hand. They abandoned some forty-five hundred soldiers—five infantry and three parachute battalions, plus supporting artillery—without a plan or leadership to execute an orderly withdrawal under fire. The Far artillerymen spiked at least some of their guns and destroyed an unknown quantity of ammunition, but by 10:00 a.m. some of the rLG’s best military units had become a disorganized mob heading southwest, eventually crossing the Mekong into Thailand.2 in Washington, the first sketchy reports about nam Tha prompted a range of reactions, including exasperation with Phoumi for provoking the debacle, indignation with the communists for attacking the town while the united States was pressuring the Lao general, and scorn for the 112 So Much to Lose fighting ability of the Far. “The boys have their track shoes on,” under Secretary of State George Ball reported to McGeorge Bundy.3 among the first State department responses to the incident was an instruction to ambassador Thompson in Moscow to protest the “flagrant violation” of the ceasefire, which endangered a Geneva agreement and risked the “resumption [of] full-scale hostilities.”4 at a White house meeting, Kennedy asked his advisers about uS options if the Pathet Lao pressed their military advantage nationwide. General Lemnitzer, standing before a map of Laos, outlined uS contingency plans for holding southern Laos up to the seventeenth parallel, just above the dividing line between north and South Vietnam. roger hilsman, who was now playing a significant role in Vietnamese and Lao affairs, objected to Lemnitzer’s plan. Walking up to the map, he declared that seizing the entire Laotian panhandle, particularly the infiltration hub at tchepone, would likely trigger chinese and north Vietnamese intervention . as an alternative, hilsman suggested that the uS military should occupy only those areas of Laos held by the rLG. controlling the population centers along the Mekong and securing the main north-south road along the river could “manage the problem presented by the infiltration routes through [tchepone],” said hilsman.5 in his own record of the meeting, hilsman observed: “i have no doubt that Lemnitzer did not appreciate a rival strategic analysis.” Michael Forrestal , who attended the meeting, recalled that Lemnitzer “stepped back and watched with absolute amazement while this brash civilian from the State department just moved in on his briefing.” defense Secretary Mcnamara, according to hilsman, was also probably “annoyed” by his “presumptuous” observation that the Far “could at least cope, after training and reorganization and better leadership, with guerrilla warfare.” Mcnamara commented that the uS mission in Laos was in a better position to judge Far capabilities than officials in Washington. This meeting, said Forrestal, “was the beginning of roger’s problems with the military.”6 in Moscow, ambassador Thompson and Soviet foreign minister Gromyko accused each other’s country of failing to control its Lao client. Thompson reminded the Soviet diplomat of a statement he had made to rusk that the Pathet Lao would not “exploit” uS efforts to pressure Phoumi. Gromyko, who denounced the Lao general’s military and political provocations, said: “Boun oum and Phoumi were allowed to do what- a Very hazardous course 113 ever they liked to prevent...