So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos

4. A Disagreeable, Hard, and Dangerous Fact

chapter 4 a disagreeable, hard, and dangerous Fact The western edge of the ho chi Minh trail ran through the nhommarathMahaxay region of the Laotian panhandle. north of this area, the trail passed from Laos across the rugged annamite Mountains into the drV. to the south, the trail led to tchepone and South Vietnam. Pathet Lao forces in nhommarath-Mahaxay had been strengthened in late 1961 by the addition of artillery, armored vehicles, and an estimated two north Vietnamese battalions. to the rLG, the enemy buildup seemed a threat to Thakhek, a Mekong river town and the headquarters of Far Groupement Mobile (GM) 14.1 in January 1962 the eighth Bataillon d’infanterie (Bi) of GM 14 conducted a “defensive sweep” south of nhommarath-Mahaxay, while the twenty-fourth Bi of GM 12 probed to the north. one goal of these flanking maneuvers was to improve the Far position should antigovernment forces attack Thakhek. another objective, ordered by Phoumi for this and similar operations nationwide, was “to pressure [the] enemy.”2 on January 17 a reconnaissance patrol of the eighth Bi engaged the Pathet Lao in a fight that included air strikes by three t-6s from the royal Lao air Force (rLaF). Slow, single-prop training aircraft, the t-6s had been configured with wing-mounted .30-caliber machine guns, five-inch rockets, and a rack under each wing for a bomb weighing no more than one hundred pounds. The next day the eighth Bi attacked Mahaxay, but antigovernment forces counterattacked with elements of one PaVn battalion, two 105mm howitzer batteries, and three armored cars. “The Far troops made what appeared to be only a token resistance and then withdrew,” General Boyle reported to cincPac. antigovernment troops also forced the twenty-fourth Bi to withdraw. While the eighth Bi regrouped, the Far 74 So Much to Lose ninth Bi and the eleventh Bataillon de parachutistes (BP) were committed to the fight, but both units “apparently stopped short of their objective without making contact with the enemy.”3 The Far suffered similar defeats in northwestern Laos. in the nam Beng Valley, a sweep by elements of GM 11 in early January encountered “stiff enemy resistance” near Muong Sai, a Pathet Lao stronghold and supply depot. a north Vietnamese–Pathet Lao counterattack forced the Far units “to withdraw hastily towards the Mekong river.” according to the leader of a uS army Special Forces training team, the commanding officer of the Third Bi of GM 11 was a politically influential major who “was frightened and stayed drunk for several days.”4 a more strategically significant Far debacle began to unfold in nam Tha, a remote provincial capital near the border with Burma and china. The headquarters of GM 11, nam Tha and its airfield were critical to supplying Far forces in northwestern Laos. on January 21 antigovernment forces, estimated at two companies, overran two Far defensive positions nineteen miles east of nam Tha, forcing the First Bi to withdraw into the town. The Second Bi, conducting a defensive sweep nearby, was also driven back into nam Tha. PaVn and Pathet Lao forces advanced toward the town, placing artillery in the hills east of the airfield. “enemy intentions at this point are not clear,” admiral Felt informed the JcS. “however, there is little doubt that he could seize the garrison if he chooses to do so.”5 The Pathet Lao and drV told the Soviets “that their operations in nam Tha Province were designed to compel Phoumi nosavan to the negotiating table.” Kremlin officials were skeptical, fearing that these actions would stiffen Phoumi’s resistance to a political settlement and risk a resumption of fighting. Khrushchev invited Souphanouvong to Moscow for a meeting in late January. according to researchers aleksander Fursenko and timothy naftali, the purpose of the “summit” was to send a message to the Prc: “The uSa and the uSSr did not intend to go to war in Laos in the name of china.” although Souphanouvong was confident that the Far garrison at nam Tha could be seized in a “few hours,” he subsequently assured aleksandr abramov, the Soviet ambassador to Laos, that the Pathet Lao would not “give any cause for provocation.”6 in a January 25 message to cincPac, General Boyle expressed his “concern ” at the “failure” of Far operations in central and northwestern Laos. a disagreeable, hard, and dangerous Fact 75 he reported that there had...