The Currents of War: A New History of American-Japanese Relations, 1899-1941

Images

Secretary of State John Hay, ca. 1902. For forty years, successive administrations would defend his Open Door policy, first from Russian advances and then, after 1905, from Japanese expansion. (Library of Congress LC-USZ62-63963) As this 1898 Puck cartoon illustrates, Japan was widely seen as standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States and Great Britain in upholding the Open Door policy. Here, the Emperor Meiji joins Uncle Sam and John Bull in protecting the Open Door from France, Germany, and Russia. (Library of Congress LC-DIG-ppmsca-28630) In Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in the summer of 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt defended the Open Door when he brought the warring parties together and mediated an end to the Russo-Japanese War. Roosevelt’s action won him the Nobel Peace Prize and brought an uneasy calm to Northeast Asia, where the two war-weary combatants faced each other in Manchuria. (Library of Congress LC-DIG-ppmsca-08199) President Roosevelt’s decision to dispatch the “Great White Fleet” on an around-the-world cruise from 1907–1908 appeared to deter Japan. Rather than fight, the Japanese prepared to welcome the fleet on its arrival in 1908. (U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph, Collection of Chief Quartermaster John Harold) In 1917 the Viscount Kikujiro Ishii (center, left) arrived in the United States on a mission to improve Japanese-American relations. Along with Secretary of State Robert Lansing (center, right), the two diplomats crafted a compromise agreement in which the United States recognized Japan’s special relationship to China in return for Tokyo’s pledge to respect the Open Door. (Library of Congress LC-DIG-hec-09434) At the 1921–1922 Washington Conference, America once again used diplomatic engagement to contain Japan and bind Tokyo to the Open Door. President Warren G. Harding (center, standing) is seen addressing the conference. (Library of Congress LC-USZ62-48849) Among Roosevelt’s longest-serving cabinet officers and a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Cordell Hull felt that he could not risk concluding a last-minute compromise with either the Konoe or the Tojo governments. (Library of Congress LC-USZ62-94179) A career State Department official and expert on East Asia, Stanley Hornbeck served two secretaries of state, Henry Stimson and Cordell Hull, and urged both men not to compromise with Japan. (Library of Congress LC-USW3-053766-C) Another career official, and a former minister to China, John Van Antwerp MacMurray did what neither Hull nor Hornbeck could. The one-time implacable opponent of Tokyo urged the Roosevelt administration to heal the widening breach with Japan. (1924, Library of Congress LC-DIG-npcc-12628) The Tojo cabinet, pictured just after its first meeting. American containment was so successful that it forced these leaders to fundamentally readjust Japanese foreign policy. (Asahi Shimbun, courtesy Wikimedia Commons) Although smiling in this picture, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura (left) and Saburo Kurusu (right) understood that time was running out to reach an agreement in Washington. (Mainichi Shimbun, courtesy Wikimedia Commons) ...