Bougainville, 1943-1945: The Forgotten Campaign

2. Allied Planning

2. Allied Planning The need to neutralize Rabaul was constantly in the minds of the planners in Australia, Hawaii, and Washington throughout 1942. Any actions in either command theater had to take into account the "Europe first" policy of the Joint Chiefs, which resulted in a relative shortage of men and materiel for the Pacific theaters. Even with this knowledge many commanders who should have known better assumed that with proper support the Allies could easily take Rabaul. In mid-1942 General MacArthur announced, perhaps only for effect, that all he would need to seize Rabaul was one full well-trained division. The long-range plans of the Joint Chiefs enunciated in their directive of 2 July 1942 also reflected this optimistic viewpoint.t Soon, however, the desperate actions in New Guinea and Guadalcanal injected caution and even pessimism into the assessment of Rabaul. The changing nature of the war, combined with a new respect for the abilities of the Japanese and complicated by two different command areas, prompted many revisions of the plans for the ultimate conquest of Rabaul and produced an ambivalence that affected the planning for the invasion of the central Solomons and then Bougainville. Because the invasion of Bougainville was to be the last in a series of assaults on Japanese-held territory in the Solomons, any alteration in plans for the neutralization of Rabaul had a direct influence on how, when, and where the Bougainville assault would be mounted. The directive of 2 July had envisioned a three-phase set of linked operations in the South and Southwest Pacific areas. The first of these was to be the seizure of Tulagi and Guadalcanal. "TaskTwo" projected the conquest of the other main Solomon Islands and Allied capture of Allied Planning 23 Lae and Salamaua and other key locations in northern New Guinea. "Task Three" projected the invasion of New Britain and the capture of Rabaul itself. This early strategic outline assigned the first phase to the South Pacific command and the other two to General MacArthur. The commanders of the two theaters and their staffs held meetings in Melbourne after receiving this directive and reached agreement on some of the broad outlines that would govern Allied activity for Tasks Two and Three. MacArthur and Halsey agreed to a general advance to seize naval and airbases in New Guinea, the Solomons, and ultimately New Britain.2 These would enable the Allies to knock out Japanese bases on target islands and ultimately to bring the entire Bismarck Archipelago, particularly Rabaul, under continuous bomber and fighter attack. Little could be undertaken, however, until the successful conclusion of the struggle for Guadalcanal. By early 1943 the Guadalcanal campaign was in its last stages, the Japanese were contained in New Guinea, and there had been a consistent buildup of men and materiel in both the Southwest and South Pacific theaters. It was therefore time to begin implementation of Task Two of the directive of the previous July. At this juncture the differences between Halsey's plans, which in general echoed King's and Nimitz's ideas, and those of MacArthur's headquarters came to the surface. MacArthur's headquarters now had fairly accurate information on the numbers of Japanese troops, planes, and naval forces available in New Guinea and the Solomons. MacArthur wanted to make certain that sufficient troops and equipment were available before launching any of the offensive operations contemplated by the 2 July directive. Halsey, having just seized the Russell Islands, wanted to utilize the forces then available to him for controlled advances against specific targets. He was mainly concerned that Nimitz would remove much of the naval force from the South Pacific for use in the projected Central Pacific offensives. Halsey wanted to invade New Georgia and capture the vital airfield at Munda by midyear. Since that island was within General MacArthur's command area, however, any action in the central Solomons would need his approval. This difference in approach was far from being an impasse, but it did suggest to the Joint Chiefs the necessity to clarify goals, command structure, and timetable in the Pacific theater. They were prodded in this direction by the more generalized agreements on strategy made at Casablanca by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Therefore, in early March the Joint Chiefs convened the Pacific Military Conference in Washington, at which repre- 24 Bougainville sentatives of MacArthur's...