Bougainville, 1943-1945: The Forgotten Campaign

1. Japanese Advances and Retreats

1. Japanese Advances and Retreats Few examples in the history of warfare would match the success of the Japanese during the first six months of World War II. Once Imperial General Headquarters made the decision that Japan's future could be secured only by aggressive actions against the United States and its Pacific allies, it set in motion a series of attacks that were, in retrospect, gambles of the highest order. The first of these, the strike against Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, was perhaps the biggest gamble of all, but the attack was absolutely necessary if Japan was to carry out its plans for further expansion in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, and it was the key to Japanese victories elsewhere in the ensuing months. Some later critics have faulted Admiral Chuichi Nagumo for not continuing his attacks against the vital docks and the supply and storage areas of Oahu, but he had succeeded in his primary mission of neutralizing the powerful United States Pacific fleet. The damage wrought during the few minutes of that raid canceled all immediate offensive plans of the United States and made defense the only possible alternative for the military planners in Washington and Pearl Harbor.1 The second gamblers' throw was to send an army and naval force against the British in Malaya. Operating against superior numbers of British and Australian troops, General Tomoyuki Yamashita conducted a most brilliant rapid advance in difficult terrain, which culminated in the capture of Singapore on 15 February 1942. The British fleet in the Indian Ocean was largely neutralized by the air attacks on Admiral Sir James Somerville's force, during which the battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk. Simultaneous 8 Bougainville actions had begun against the Phillipines on 8 December 1941, and successful Japanese air attacks destroyed almost all the u.s. fighter and bomber force on Luzon. Although the Japanese timetable for conquering the main Philippine islands was set back by the heroic defense of Bataan and Corregidor, the final issue was never in doubt since there was no reasonable possibility of reinforcing General Douglas MacArthur's outnumbered force. General Masaharu Homma, although dissatisfied with the progress of his army, all but finished his task when the Bataan defenders surrendered on 8 April 1942.2 These early victories were complemented by others-the conquest of Wake Island, the occupation of Hong Kong, the defeat of the British in Burma. Finally, in March 1942 one of their major goals, the petroleum-rich Dutch East Indies fell to the Japanese. Everywhere the Japanese navy and army had been successful. The Pearl Harbor stroke had assured the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, of short-term naval dominance of the Central and South Pacific. During the early months of 1942 only token Australian forces stood in the way of Japanese occupation of New Guinea and ultimately, perhaps, even the conquest of the sparsely inhabited continent of Australia itself. Yet the rapid and, in some cases, unexpected successes in all areas had negative overtones also. Imperial General Headquarters, enamored of the victories, did not assign clear priorities to its objectives. Instead, Japanese naval, army, and air forces were spread thin over the vast area of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. As a result, commanders in the field had insufficient forces in anyone region to achieve the necessary intermediate objectives. This was certainly the situation facing the Japanese commanders in the southernmost part of the newly conquered Co-Prosperity Sphere. The lack of troops and materiel was one major factor in the failure of the Japanese to take Port Moresby and place themselves in a position to threaten northern Australia directly. Those first months of the war proved to be a heady experience for the Japanese commanders; throughout much of 1942 they blithely advanced their plans for continued offensive operations, despite the fact that Allied strength was slowly. recovering from the devastating blows delivered earlier. On 8 and 9 March a large Japanese task force stood off northern New Guinea and landed troops at Lae and Salamaua . Two days later the Japanese had secured Finschaven to the north. Within a few weeks radio stations and airfields had been established at both Lae and Salamaua.3 Thus the Japanese before the end of March were firmly established on the north coast and were Japanese Advances and Retreats 9 ready not only to expand...