Bougainville, 1943-1945: The Forgotten Campaign

Introduction

Introduction Historians are continually trying to impose order on the past, to simplify events that would otherwise appear chaotic. By nature and by training, they are inclined to search for first causes that would explain all subsequent events. Among military historians this desire to seek out causation is especially strong, and there is a pronounced tendency to identify the one crucial event that altered the course of a battle, a campaign, or a war. It is questionable whether t,his practice has any validity for conflicts that took place before the twentieth century, but certainly in the case of the two world wars, it is patently impossible to isolate a single event that irrevocably changed the course of the conflict. No event stood in isolation from its antecedents or from simultaneous actions on other fronts in these large and immensely complicated wars. Nevertheless, historians have tried to pick a turning point. Apparently, historians of the Pacific theater of World War II are divided over two main possibilities. One group finds the key victory in the Battle of Midway, after which the Japanese never recovered the naval initiative. The other group attributes supreme importance to the land, air, and sea battles off Guadalcanal. There is some validity to both claims, but it shouldbe obvious that however vital these conflicts were to final victory for the Allies, they were simply important links in a long chain of interconnected developments. Japan lost the war because of a series of complex strategic and tactical defeats, among which the Solomon Islands campaigns played a significant part. It would be an exaggeration to maintain that Japan lost the war in the Solomons, but it would be equally wrong to ignore 2 Bougainville the effects on the Japanese of attempts to defend Munda, Kolombangara , and Bougainville after their defeat at Guadalcanal. The various battles on and around this long string of fetid, jungle-covered islands took a toll in ships, planes, and men that the Japanese, in attempting to meet the demands of other theaters, could never replace. It is in this context that one must view the Bougainville campaigns . Largely forgotten today, the Bougainville assault in 1943 was considered absolutely vital to prepare for the invasion of New Britain and the negation of Rabaul, Japan's major fortress and air and sea base in the South Pacific. From mid-1942 onward the Allied commanders in the South and Southwest Pacific had concentrated on Rabaul, first as the key to defending Port Moresby and southern New Guinea and then in planning the step-by-step offensive leading to the invasion of New Britain. Under the general directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur in Brisbane and Vice-Admiral William F. Halsey in Noumea cObperated in a two-pronged series of attacks in New Guinea and the central Solomons during the spring and summer of 1943. Both commanders, supplied with more men and materiel, had by then adopted the practice ofbypassing large Japanese forces whenever possible and allowing them to "wither on the vine." They could not always do so, however. The planning for and operations against New Georgia in July and August 1943 provide a good example of the difficulty involved in a large-scale offensive directed against a clever commander with dedicated troops operating in a jungle environment. Nevertheless, despite a brilliant defense by the Japanese, New Georgia and its important airfield, Munda, were captured, and in the same month Vella Lavella was occupied without incident. Thus all the preliminaries for action against the last of the major Solomon Islands had been completed. Bougainville, with its six airfields, could not be bypassed, especially in view of its proximity to Rabaul. Fighters and medium bombers operating from airstrips on Bougainville could bring Rabaul under constant attack. After considerable discussion and the abandonment of a number of plans, Admiral Halsey, with MacArthur's concurrence, decided to forgo attacking the main Japanese bases on Bougainville. Rather, after a feint by a marine landing party on Choiseul Island and a strike to negate the Japanese airfields in the south, Halsey would send the 3d Marine Division into Empress Augusta Bay against lightly held positions at Cape Torokina. The mission of the marines, backed up by the army's 37th Division, was at first to seize and hold a lodgment and Introduction 3 then expand it outward to permit the construction of airfields from which Air...