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293 16 Paris Peace Talks and Ripple Effects May 1968–April 1969 The doors were opened to commence peace negotiations when the president of the United States of America made his surprising announcement on 31 March 1968. The conference of diplomats opened in Paris on 10 May 1968.1 The talks were to continue throughout my year in South Vietnam and for some years thereafter. The prospect of a peace by negotiation fuelled hopes of an early settlement of the war, certainly so for the troops. The talks in Paris cast shadows over our efforts in Vietnam, some pleasant, most dark. They had what I describe as a ripple effect on some of our thinking and actions. A sobering question was put to me soon after my arrival in Vietnam: “Who is going to win the war?” The answer to that question has remained with me since: “the Vietnamese.” President Thieu had a basic policy with respect to any negotiation with North Vietnam, the “Four Nos” discussed in chapter 2. I cannot recall if that policy was known to the Free World Military Assistance Forces in South Vietnam in 1968. Some elements of policy flowing from the GVN position were understood, like the banning of some opposition political parties in the national elections. Clearly, the “Four Nos” created a conundrum for the negotiators in Paris. The moral purpose of being involved in the war was raised again in my mind with the peace negotiations under way. To what extent should nations pursue warfare when the outcomes are so uncertain ? The belligerents had their respective negotiating positions. The issues arising were to test and expose their ethical positions. These matters were up for debate in Paris, as well as in many other capitals, as the negotiations unravelled. Reputations of nations and individuals were at stake. Leaders and officials were to be tested. Meanwhile the military forces continued their operations. 294 TEAM 19 IN VIETNAM Two weeks after my arrival I recorded two of the key current measures of success on the battlefield: how many kills and how many weapons captured. The thinking was that the NVA and the VC had a manpower advantage over the ARVN and U.S. Forces. A consequence of this was the view that the shooting war would be inconclusive and likely could end only with a negotiated settlement. The voice of public opinion, particularly in the United States, was pressuring the president and his administration to bring the troops home. The future rested with the negotiators. This was the mood after Tet 1968. I made this assessment of the people in Quang Tri in early June 1968. It was apparent that individual Vietnamese, their families, and indeed their government were accepting handouts and goods in generous amounts. The people seemed to have set aside their pride. Their attempts at self-help appeared to be minimal. A mood of dependency may have set in. The United States was really bleeding itself of funds, for what return? My diary entry concluded that I would have to wait and see. My anguish was shared by my American colleagues. From my experience of but one month with the Americans in South Vietnam I sensed that I was working within matrices of multilayered organizations, overlapping and somewhat confusing. It was clear that the United States did not want to do everything for the South Vietnamese. It wanted to assist them in a deadly serious environment . However, it seemed that since they were given so much by the United States, the hosts expected things to be done for them as well. I was sure that the “Vietnamese will only pull themselves together after the US has departed, whenever that may be.” The same idea was expressed in a later letter home: “With their present attitude, the Vietnamese are reluctant to rebuild, and to get works under way. This is a big problem for the Americans right now and for me too: as I have to help them pursue their policies.” The psychological war was ongoing, influencing the attitudes of people worldwide in regard to the war and the peace negotiations. The North Vietnamese representatives in Paris proclaimed that the NVA was not in South Vietnam. Sadly, many believed this lie to be a fact. In August there was a report of a temporary cessation of bombing on North Vietnam. We were aware that the NVA could, under these circumstances, bring military divisions up to the DMZ and [52.14.150.55] Project...

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